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Professor Lee believes that the generic capital 
gains rate should not be increased over 28 percent 
for revenue and political reasons. But to reflect that, 
on the average, capital gains realized by middle-in-
come families consists entirely of inflation gain, 
while half of the capital gain realized at the 31-
percent bracket and above consists of economic 
gain, increasing to SO-percent economic at the very 
top, he argues that a greater exclusion should be 
provided at · the 28- and IS-percent brackets, either 
by a "progressive schedule" or by a $3,500 annual 
exclusion. To ' strengthen the political base for in-
creasing the top rates 'and to avoid the risk of the 
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conservative coalition in Congress passing a generic 
capital gains cut as an offset, he advocates that the 
top current 'rate on income retained in expansion of 
an active business by a passthrough entity be 
limited to 34 percent, with the full top individual 
rates imposed when the retained earnings are 
withdrawn or the interest in the entity disposed of. 
The author also recommends that the proposed 
small business corporation tax cut should expire as 
to subsequent new small-business issues if the pro-
vision does not attract sufficient outside capital 
during a test period. Lee further recommends 
against taxing at death unrealized capital apprecia-
tion, because it almost certainly would engender a 
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I. FLAT RATE CAPITAL 
GAINS PREFERENCE 
A. Background 
1. Clinton's flat rate preference. President 
Clinton's income tax proposals would increase the top 
ordinary rates to 36 percent at around $140,000 in tax-
able family income and, in effect, to more than 41 p er-
cent at $250,000 in taxable income. At the same time, 
the maximum individual across-the-board or generic 
capital gains tax rate would remain at 28 percent. This 
flat rate capital gains preference of 13 points or so 
would provide the practical effect of a 9.6-percent ex-
clusion at the 31-percent bracket (commencing at 
$89,150 in taxable family income), a 22-percent ex-
clusion at the 36-percent bracket, and a 31.7-percent 
exclusion at the 41 -percent rate. At the 28-percent 
and the lower IS-percent brackets, a generic capital 
gain would be afforded no preference. Over 70 per-
cent of individual capital gains are realized by in-
dividuals at the 31-percent and, especially, at the 
highest brackets, where nearly 75 percent of the 
families annually realize capital gains with an 
average gain of $100,000 or so, according to a 1990 
Joint Committee on Taxation aCT) study. At such 
higher levels, according to a 1985 CBO study, on the 
average, 50 percent of realized capital gains are 
economic, i.e., in excess of the rate of inflation while 
held, rising to 80 percent at the very top. At lower 
levels, on the average, none of the usually irregularly 
realized capital gains exceed the rate of inflation . 
Thus, the effective exclusion under the 28-percent 
flat rate capi tal gains preference regreSSively would 
increase proportionately with both economic gains 
and higher income and decrease proportiona tely 
with both percentage of inflation ga in and lower in-
come. 
The administration's answer to the 
charge that the 28-percent flat rate 
ceiling is the equivalent of a generic 
capital gains cut no doubt would be 
that such flat rate is not a 'cut,' but 
merely retains the existing capital 
gains cap. 
2. Congressional criticism. Some tax-writin g 
members of Congress, including Senator Bill Bradley, 
D-N.J., and Representatives Robert Matsui, D-Cali£.. 
and Sander Levin, D-Mich., in the February 24 Senate 
Finance Committee and March 9 and 10 House Ways 
and Means hearings on the president's economic 
plan, have criticized a flat maximum 28-percent 
generic capital gains rate. These members questioned 
the Secretary of the Treasury, Lloyd Bentsen, and the 
Chair of the President's Economic Council, Laura 
Tyson, at these hearings as to why (a) generiC capital 
gains were not subject to the higher rates, and (b) the 
generic capital gains preference was only available 
to high-income individuals. 
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3. Administration's rationales. Candidate Clinton 
had opposed a generic capital gains cut on the stump.' 
The administration's answer to the charge that the 28-
percent flat rate ceiling is the equivalent of a generic 
capital gains cut no doubt would be that this flat rate 
is not a "cut," but merely retains the existing capital 
gains cap. 
Dr. Tyson's response at the March 9, 1993 House 
hearing was that the objectives of the Clinton tax pack-
age were "deficit reduction, balance, progressivity, and 
incentives for investment - I would say those are OUf 
main objectives - and [we will try to be sure that the 
package accomplishes them] ... in a way which is as 
least distortionary as possible."2 In short, the 28-per-
cent generic capital gains cap res ted on "balance," 
'''My objection is to an across-the-board capi tal gains cut 
on stocks traded on the s tock exchange, which is where 
Senator Tsongas concentrates his - and let me "rgue one, we 
tripled the stock market in the 'SOs. That's fine. We can't do 
any bette r than that in the '90s. We can't do belief than triple. 
But average wages went down, the work week lengthened, 
poverty exploded, we los t our competitive edge. So my argu-
ment is, this inequality that we got was accompanied by 
declining economic growth. .. And to give these across-the-
board cuts to people who've got - look at thi s, that's who's 
going to benefit from the across-the-board capital gains, the 
people th at have got 60 percent of the weal th in the last 
decade, and it did not make us a richer country." Trall script of 
Democratic Candidates Debate: Gov. Bill Clill tOIl, Sell. I'alll Tsongas, 
and fern; Brown, Chicago, Monday, March 16, 1992. "I am op-
posed to Senator Tsonga::;'s proposal for a capital gains tax 
cut. That has nothing to do with the manufact uring base of 
this country any more. Look at Genera l Motors. You give it 
capi tal gains tax cut, you drive up the value of General Motors 
stock, they s till lay the workers off here and continue to build 
a plant in Ge rmany and one in Mexico. The ca pital gains cu t 
no longer is tied to in ves tment in American jobs. And I am 
against the across-the-board cuts for the weal thy that got 60 
percent of the wealth for only 1 percent of the people in 19S0. 
So let's give incentives to peop le, but only if they invest in 
our jobs, our peop.le, and our future." Transcript of Presidential 
Candidate Gov. Bill Cl inton's News Conference, Chicago, Ill inois, 
September 21, 1992. 
2She was summing up her prev ious more complete ration-
ale for higher rates but a 2S-percent maximum capital gains 
rate. "Dr. Tyson: . _ . [Flirst, it brings us back full circle back 
to the first question of the chairman, which is in it way, when 
you try to ... we' re in a situation where we want to use a .. . 
we need to use revenues as part of deficit reduction, to get 
- first of all, to get a credible amount o f deficit red uction, it 
really requ ires some revenues. Secondly, we want to do thi s 
in a balanced way. But once we get to that, we - dnd then 
we also have, inciden tally, the goa l of trying to restore some 
of the progressivi ty into the tax system, which really was 
reduced during the 19S05." Unofficial Transcript of March 9, 
1993 Ways & Menns Hearing on Clinton EconoTllic Plnll, 
electronically reproduced, 93 Tax Noles Today 59-93. 
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which can be a political as well as economic virtue.3 
Secretary Bentsen addressed the 28-percent ra te query 
with two rationales: (1) that 28 percent was the revenue 
maximizing rate4 because above that b locking 
resulted,s and (2) "to encourage to some degree people 
moving into equities to try to help start new ventures 
and to try to build new companies."6 As to the second 
point of reinvestment of funds from public market 
sales in new ventures, Congress bought that argument 
before in 1942, despite misgivings as to its accuracy.7 
At the present and probably throughout the past, non-
institutional financing of closely held businesses, 
whether mom and pop retail or start-up ventures (more 
machine tool than Silicon Valley), can only be obtained 
3The economic virtue is economic efficiency if a rate above 
28 percent reduces realizations that historically have fol-
lowed the market more than rates. That is not to say that rates 
may not have had an effect on the market; witness the 19205 
and 1980s speculative booms. The political virtue of a 28-per-
cent maximum rate is that without it a majority of conserva-
tive, mostly southern, Democrats likely would rejoin the Re-
publicans in forming a "conservative coalition" in either 
blocking the proposed rate increases or more probably, and 
even worse, restoring a much lower generic capital gains 
preference, possibly just half of the 28-percent rate. My guess 
is that this would more likely occur in the Senate than in the 
House. 
4Joint Committee Chief of Staff Ron Pearlman had offered 
28.6 percent as a possible revenue-maximizing rate in the 
1990 Senate hearings on tax incentives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 
65; accord JCS-19-90, p. 41. 
5Since already 50 percent of annual appreciation in public 
stock held by individuals is not realized prior to the share-
holder's death, increas ing the rate on capital gains to 36 or 
41 percen t is likely to reduce (a) realizations, at least among 
nontraders, and (b) revenues from thi s sector. 
60fficial Transcript of Senate's Clinton Economic Proposal 
Heari'lg, February 24, 1993, electronically reproduced 93 Tax 
Notes Today 48-79. At the March 10, 1993 House Ways and 
Means hearing, Secretary Bentsen explained to Rep. Matsui, 
D-Calif., that the 13-point differential "was done with intent 
and an understanding that it would probably encourage a 
shift toward investment. That's the purpose of it, that it will 
cause an increased interest in equity investments that would 
help start businesses and create jobs. That is fully under-
stood. There's another point that economists argue, that at 
some point you get the locked in feature more, and some 
would argue that you're near that breaking point at 28 per-
cent. So that is another thing under consideration, that you 
lose revenue if you get it too high; assets get locked in . But 
there is an absolute and full intent to try to encourage invest-
ment." 
1Compare H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1942) 
with 1942 House Hearings on Rroenue Rroision, 77th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (Vol. 1) 265, (Vol. 2) 163-64 (1942) (colloquy between 
Treasury Special Tax Adviser Randolph Paul and Rep. Reed, 
R-N.Y.). 
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from the entrepreneur, family, and friends. s The 
revenue estimators seem, however, to assume substan-
t ial movement of funds, probably from the public s tock 
sector, to qualified small business corporations via 
pooled investment funds. Except for foregone trades 
due to funds tied up for five years in small business 
corporation holdings, where would they get revenue 
losses during the first five years of the provision? 
Foregone sales of the small businesses themselves 
during the first five years after creation surely con-
stitute a small source for such estimated revenue 
losses, given the minimal likelihood of sales of such 
businesses during the first five years of operation 
a nyway. 
4. Why reward chu rning as a way of life? Com-
bining the CBO and JCT studies discussed at l.A.5 and 
l.A.6 below, the apparent pattern is that, year after 
year, the same high-income individuals, say the top 2 
percent, realize the bulk of capital gains reported . Most 
of that gain is from public stock, and most is economic. 
Also, data from the 1960s and earlier decades shows 
that the higher up the income scale, the greater the 
percentage of the taxpayers in that class who annually 
realize capital gains and the greater percentage of total 
income that their capita l gains amount to on the 
average. Thus, the populis t charge, during the 1920s 
and 1930s and again during the past 10 years, that a 
generic capital gains preference mostly rewards churn-
ing on the secondary public stock market by high-in-
come individuals for whom such regular gains are a 
major if not the principal source of their income, is 
basically true. 
That being the case, why do I support a 28-percent 
cap on generic capital gains? First, I surmise that the 
package of "ideal" rules described in V. below is not 
now politically obtainable and, worse, that attempts to 
enact them could instead trigger enactment by the con-
servative coalition of less equitable provisions than the 
current rules. Second, taxing generic capital gains at 
ordinary rates (a) is equally unobtainable politically 
while retaining, or even harder, reinstituting, high or-
dinary rates, as evidenced by President Carter's 1978 
failed attempt to repeal capital gains; and (b) based on 
the high rates without a capital gains preference ex-
perience of 1916-1920, and assuming the 28.S-percent 
revenue maximizing capital gains rate estimated by the 
SHearings on Economic Growth and the President's Budget 
Proposals Before the Senate Firulnce Committee (Part 1), 102d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 56, 60 (1992) (Statement of Robert Gilbertson, 
representing American Electronics Association) (Venture 
Economics data indicates 96 percent of equi ty financing in 
sma ll s tart-up companies comes from " th e owner / 
entrepreneur himself, his relatives, friends, or groups of small 
businessmen ... who will take some of their money and put 
it into a risk pool together") (the latter pattern is strong in 
some immigrant groups); accord id. at 61 (Statement of John J. 
Motley, representing National Federation of Independent 
Business) (NFIB study reached same conclusion); Hearings on 
Impact, Effectiveness, and Fairness of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
before the House Ways and Means Committee, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 118 (1990) (statement of Professor Auerbach); id . at 130 
(statement of Henry Aaron) . 
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Joint Committee on Taxation Staff,9 would reduce reve-
nues (unless coupled with taxation of unrealized capi-
tal appreciation at death, in which case the "conserva-
tive coalition" on capital gains10 would surely demand 
and get a generic capital gains cut as a trade-off). The 
28-percent cap, coupled with a substantial ordinary 
rate increase, is the remaining alternative for restoring 
some of the eroded progressivity of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, when effective rates a t the top fell from 36 
percent to 22 percent (subsequently to rise back to 28 
percent).ll Thirdly, I conclude in 11.0. and E. below that 
the PAL changes and a generic 28-percent capital gains 
rate would not revive 1976-1986 style tax shelters (but 
I would recommend total real estate depreciation 
recapture, at least for taxpayers not subject to PAL due 
to the proposed real estate business exception). And 
under the implicit "rule of 28," discussed at II.E. below, 
the old progressivity Ihorizontal equi ty effective rate 
disparities at the top individual brackets should not 
reappear. 
B. Analysis 
This section assumes that the top permanent rate on 
individual capital gains will not be above 28 percent 
in the final legislation for revenue and political rea-
sons. It focuses, therefore, on the question of whether 
some deduction or exclusion should be provided for 
capital gains of taxpayers below the top rates, or per-
haps at the top rate. This question is addressed first 
from an equity perspective focusing on (a) the inverse 
relationship between income level of individual tax-
payers reporting capital gains and inflation component 
of realized capital gains, and (b) the direct relationship 
between income level and the percentage of capital 
gains regularly reported. The article then sketches the 
historical experience of flat rate capital gains in the 
Revenue Act of 1921 and the botched remedies over the 
following decades that resulted in great vertical and 
horizontal inequities from around 1976 to 1986, which 
were exacerbated by the tax shelter boom. In con-
clusion, this section advocates, much like the 1992 
Senate and Conference versions of H.R. 4210, an in-
dividual schedule of "progressive" rates on capital 
gain, ranging from a zero rate at the IS-percent ordi-
nary income bracket to 28 percent at the 36-percent 
bracket on policy (rough mimicking of percentage of 
gain equal to rate of inflation while held) and distribu-
tional or fairness grounds. A simpler alternative with 
9Hearings on Tax Incentives for Increasing Savings alld Invest -
ments before the Senate Finance Committee, lOIst Cong., 2d Sess. 
65 (1990) (Statement of Ronald Pearlman, Chief of Staff, Joint 
Committee on Taxation.) 
l~he votes on capital gains in the House in 1989 reveal a 
pattern of all but one or two House Republicans plus a 
majority of conservative, mostly Southern, Democrats (less 
than 25 percent of all Democrats) voting one way while the 
remaining House Democrats voted the other way. Such a 
voting pattern gives rise to the conservative coalition so 
defined by the Congressional Quarterly. 
IIHouse Ways and Means Majority Staff, Tax Progressivity 
and Income Distribution, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (Comm. Print 
1990). 
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much the same effect would be an xclusion of the first 
$3,500 in annual capital gains, perhaps phased out 
across th e 31-percent bracket much like the proposals 
by Senator Gaylord Nelson, D-Wis., in the 1970s, the 
Bush administration in 1989, and House Ways and 
Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., in 1990. 
1. Inflation element. Perversely, the proposed flat 
28-percent maximum individual capital gains rate con-
stitutes the mirror image of the percentage of realized 
capital gains equal to the rate of inflation while held, 
by income classes. In all published government studies 
the percentage of economic income, if any, increases 
with income level and, conversely, the percentage of 
gain equal to the rate of inflation increases with 
decreasing income levels. Thus in 1980, according to a 
1985 CBO study, Indexing Capital Gains, individual tax-
payers with adjusted gross income above $100,000 en-
joyed, on the average, a 50-percent "real" or economic 
gain as to capital gains reported that year. As the in-
come level rose above $100,000, the percentage of 
economic gain on the average rose as well, reaching 82 
percent at the $1 million AGI level (and accounting for 
18 percent of realized gains that year). Below the 
$100,000 AGI level, on the average, all reported capital 
gains as a percentage of basis were less than the rate 
of inflation while held, i.e., all "inflationary" gain. 
These extremes may have been skewed in 1980 with a 
beginning s tock market boom following a period of 
stagflation, but the same general pattern is consistent 
across the recent decades. Former JCT Chief of Staff 
Ron Pearlman once told me that this pattern reflects 
that many high-income individuals sell public stock 
after relatively short holding periods and dispose of 
improved rea l estate, which until the late 1980s bust 
did better than the rate of inflation. Conversely, mid-
dle-income individuals realizing capital gains tend to 
have longer holding periods and hence fail to keep up 
with inflation. 
2. Recurring capital gains. The Joint Committee, 
through " timed series" studies of capital gains realiza-
tions by a sample of the CBO study'S taxpayers from 
1978-83, demonstrated that the sa me high-i ncome in-
dividuals with multiple transactions year after year 
accounted for 80 percent of the tax benefits of a generic 
capital gains preference with an average capital gain 
of about $100,000. 12 Conversely, while taxpayers realiz-
ing capital gain in only one of the five years sampled 
amounted to over 60 percent of the taxpayers in the 
five-year sample, their gains in the aggregate 
12Almost 60 percent of the capital gains rea lized in the 
sa mple went to the 15.7 percent of the individuals who 
reported capital gains in all five years surveyed, with an 
average gain of $100,000; over 70 percent went to those with 
gains in four out of the five years. Joint Committee Staff, 
Explanation of Methodology Used to Estimate Proposals Affecting 
tile Taxation of Income from Capital Gains 48-9 OCS-19-90}; Hear-
ings on Tax Incelltives for Increasing Savillgs and In vestmellts 
Before the Senate Finance Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 70 
(1990); Hearings on Impact, Ef!ectivene:;s, and Fainress of tlte Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 before tlte H(ll/se Ways and Means Committee, 
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 216-17, 248-49,273 (1990) . This study 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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amounted to only 10 percent of the capital gains 
reported with an average capital gain of $2,000,13 or 
about $3,500 in today's dollars. 
3. Flat rate capital gains before. In 1921, Congress 
enacted a flat 121h-percent individual capital gains rate 
for gains from capital assets held two years or longer. 
Congressional tax writers were familiar with the 60-
percent drop-off in revenues at the highest brackets 
despite a general boom during the period 1916-18, 
when capital gains were subject to full ordinary rates 
rising to above 70 percent.14 Accordingly, they enacted 
the flat rate to unlock blocked transactions and thus 
increase revenues. IS With this move, progressivity be-
came a farce, as was the entire income tax. 16 For ex-
ample, in the boom year 1925, only 70,000 out of 2.5 
million taxpaying individuals were at brackets higher 
than 121!.z percent (those earning more than $30,000, 
today's $210,000), and the less than 10,000 earning 
$100,000 or more garnered almost 90 percent of the 
benefits from the flat capital gains rateY These same 
individuals paid almost 50 percent of the income 
taxes. IS 
In 1934, Congress's first attempt to reform the capital 
gains preference attempted too much: a capital gains 
deduction for middle-income taxpayers, an "unblock-
ing" rate for high-income taxpayers with most of the 
capital gains, and a rough offset for inflation (which 
would not return until after World War II) . The result 
was a "confusing" sliding scale deduction format 
reaching a maximum 70-percent deduction (with maxi-
mum rate of 20.1 percent at the top bracket) at 10 years. 
In fact, as Treasury had warned, this sliding scale or 
(Footnote 12 continued.) 
was requested by then Rep. (now Senator) Byron Dorgan, 
D-N.D. The high-income taxpayers' share of the tax benefit 
of the capital gains preference is even greater than their share 
of realized capital gains, due to the added gear of a higher 
ordinary rate avoided by the capital gain. And their share of 
economic gain is highest of all. 
13Methodology, supra note 12 at 48-9. 
14See 61 Congo Rec. (Part 5) 5289 (House August 19, 1921) 
(Remarks of Rep. Green, R-Iowa, House Ways and Means 
member); Confidential Hearings on H.R . 8245 before the Senate 
Finance Committee, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-7, 306-07 (1921) 
(statement of Senator Reed Smoot, R-Utah). 
15H.R. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921). 
15Due to generous personal and family exemptions, only 
2~ million taxpayers (out of 30 to 40 million workers) were 
subject to the income tax while more federal revenues were 
raised from regressive excise taxes, as the taxwriting commit-
tees knew in the 1930s. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1932 
before tile Senate Finance Committee, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 
(1932) (Statement of Sec'ty of Treasury Ogden Mills). This 
same pattern actually intensified under President Franklin 
Roosevelt. See Leff, The Limits of Symbolic Reform (Cambridge 
University Press 1984). 
17Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Sup-
plemental Report on Capital Gains and Losses Vol. 1, Pt. 7, p. 5-5 
(1929); Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways alld 
Means, Proposed Revision of the Revenue lAws, 1938, 75th Cong., 
3d Sess. 90 (1938) . 
18Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1938, before tile Hou se Com-
mittee on Ways and Means , 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 116-21 (1938). 
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"step rate" resulted in blocking, as high-income tax-
payers clustered at the 10-year mark, while middle-in-
come taxpayers with capital gains clustered at the first 
steps with smaller deductions and hence higher rates.19 
This blocking charge carried the day as the Depression 
"double-dipped" in 1938 following the lesser known 
stock market crash of 1937, resulting in shorter holding 
periods for the lowest rates and in the final com-
promise in 1942 of a 50-percent long-term (six-month 
holding period) capital gains deduction for the in-
dividual with a small income and an alternative [25-
percent flat] capital gains rate for the high-income tax-
payer.20 By this time, 70 million taxpayers were covered 
by the income tax and the top ordinary rates were 
climbing back up to soon reach 90 percent. This alter-
native flat rate continued unchanged until the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, which partially limited it with a 
$50,000-per-year ceiling (probably then the average 
realized capital gain at the top). After repeated failed 
attempts by tax liberals to repeal this remaining flat 
rate preference for the rich, Congress eliminated it in 
1978 as a weak tradeoff, along with lengthening the 
holding period from the 1942-established six months 
to one year, for enacting at the same time the conser-
vative coalition's increase in the basic exclusion from 
the 50-percent established by the 1942 Act to a 60-per-
cent deduction. President Carter had campaigned on 
repeal of the capital gains preference, arousing the spe-
cial interests, which then united to force Carter to back 
down on repeaL although the president still called for 
tightening up the capital gains rules for high-income 
individuals. Once the capital gains lobby geared up to 
fight the repeal prevailed, it shifted to the offensive 
and sought a greater preference (double-dipping in-
dexing in the House) .21 
The result of high nominal rates, coupled with a 
substantial capital gains preference, was a pattern from 
at least the 1950s through the mid 1980s of two-thirds 
to three-fourths of high-income taxpayers achieving an 
effective income tax rate far below the maximum 
nominal rate, while the remaining high-income in-
dividuals were taxed at effective rates closer to the 
nominal progreSSive rates. For example, in the 19605 
and 1970s, the general pattern was that the average 
effective rate for high-income individuals was 35 per-
cent. Those taxpayers with heavy capital gains (higher 
average income) had an effective rate of 22 percent, 
while the others had an effective rate in the high 40s 
19H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1942); State-
ment of Acting Secretary of the Treasury regarding the Preliminary 
Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means 6 
(1933). 
20The explicit aiming of the 50-percent deduction at the 
taxpayer with small capital gains and the flat rate at the 
taxpayer with a large capital gains income is revealed in the 
legislative history to the two-step capital gains provision 
adopted in the Revenue Act of 1938. Confidential Senate Hear-
ings 011 H.R. 9682 (Revenue Act of 1938) before the Senate Finance 
Committee (Part 1), 75th Cong., 3d Sess. II , 15-16 (1938) (slate-
ment of Dr. Roswell Magill, Under Secretary of Treasury). 
21"Tax Cut for Capital Gains Stalled," 7 Tax Notes 702 Oune 
19, 1978}. 
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and even 50s, when the maximum rate ranged from the 
70s all the w ay to the 90s.22 
As Stanley Surrey pointed out in the 1950s tax policy 
hearings led by House Ways and Means Chairman Wil-
bur Mills, D-Ark., the extreme disparity between top 
ordinary rates and the alternative 25-percent capital 
gains rates after the Revenue Act of 1942 first led seem-
ingly inexorably to Congress incrementally bestowing 
capital gains on add itional special interests, starting 
with timber and then coal and iron royalties, livestock, 
improved real estate, patents, etc., in the 1940s and 
1950s.23 The political basis for such legislation was the 
conservative coalition on capital gains, which also 
defeated or watered down direct and indirect capital 
gains reforms in the 1960s and 1970s.24 This coalition 
consisted of almost all the Republicans and a majority 
of Southern Democrats, who squared off against the 
rest of the Democrats. Simplified, perhaps to the point 
of caricature, the Southern Democrats, particularly in 
the House, supported a generic preference to take care 
of timber, lives tock, and small business, while Re-
publicans supported it to take care of public stock held 
by high-income individuals and perhaps some of the 
Democratic-favored interest groups as well, particularly 
timber, in the case of southern Republicans. 
4. Suggested capital gains preference for the small 
income. Given that, on the average, capital gains real-
ized by taxpayers below the 31-percent bracket are less 
than the rate of inflation for the period the capital asset 
was held, and that, on the average, perhaps 50 percent 
of the gain realized by taxpayers above the 28-percent 
rate exceeds the rate of inflation (rising to 80 percent 
at the top brackets), a flat 28-percent rate providing no 
capital gains preference a t all to those taxed below that 
rate is inequitable, just as the Democrats acknowledged 
in 1934.25 A flat exclusion, say 30 percent, still benefi ts 
high-income individuals with 60 percent to 70 percent 
22110 Congo Rec. (Part 2) 1438 (Senate Jan. 30, 1964) 
(Remarks of floor manager Senator Russell Long, D-La.). 
23Joint Committee on Economic Report, Federal Tax PoIiCl) 
for Economic Growth and Stability: Papers SlIbmitted by Panelists 
Appearing before the Subcommittee on Tax Policy, 84th Cong., 
1st Sess. 104 (Comm. Print 1956). 
24President John F. Kennedy and Stanley Surrey unsuc-
cessfully attempted in 1963 to couple an increase in the capi-
tal gains excl usion from 50 percent to 70 percent with 
elimination of the 1940s/50s statutory capital gains add-ons 
and taxation of unrealized capital appreCiation at death . Next 
the 1969 minimum tax on individual tax preferences, al-
though mostly directed at capital gains (80 percent of the 
preferences consisted of the then-50-percent long-term capi· 
tal gains exclusion), was never very effective as long as capi-
tal gains were subject to it due to low rates and offsets. The 
role of the conservative coalition in capital gains legislation 
and the interest groups represented became evident in the 
1970s, with numerous separate votes and debates on capital 
gains, the impact of the mini-tax's (antecedent to the AMT) 
on capital gains, and the tax treatment of unrealized capital 
appreciation at death. 
25Confidential Hearings on H.R. 7385 (Revenlle Act of 1934) 
Before the Senate Finance Commillee (Part 1), 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 107 (1934) (Colloquy between Senator Reed, R-Pa ., rank-
ing minority member, and Roswell Magill). 
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of the gains inequitably, because lower-rate taxpayers 
who realize a capital gain (a) by virtue of such rate 
receive a lesser benefit, and (b) on the average, are 
taxed totally on inflation gain with no economic gain 
while higher income taxpayers, on the average, enjoy 
a 50-percent economic gain (rising to 80 percent at the 
very top, some years). 
On the average, in contrast, a "progressive" formula, 
as the Senate and House passed in 1992 but President 
Bush vetoed, providing an increasing capital gains rate 
from zero percent to 28 percent move from the lowest 
to the highest individual bracket works rough justice 
at the top and bottom, but less so in the middle. I 
therefore recommend that Congress pass it again. 
Rather than the 14-percent and 21-percent rates26 at the 
28-percent and 31-percent brackets, however, I would 
use the average percentage of inflation gain at these 
levels as the exclusion percentage. This percentage 
probably would be 50 percent at the 31-percent bracket 
and considerably higher at the 28-percent bracket. A 
progressive formula is preferable to indexing, apart 
from the distributional effects and out year costs of in-
dexing,27 because indexing probably would lead to 
high-income individuals making considerably fewer 
trad es (as they held on to an investment with an eco-
nomic gain waiting for inflation to catch up), thus at 
least reducing revenue and possibly a decrease in eco-
nomic efficiency. 
A substantial disadvantage of the progressive rate 
is i ts cost - perhaps $8 billion over a five-year window. 
26Equivalent to a 50-percent and roughly 30-percent ex-
clusion. 
27Dis tributi onally, the Senate Finance Committee's 
progressive cap ital gains cut would have moved the tax 
benefits away from the top quite effectively. For example, in 
1992, only 34.2 percent of its projected benefits would have 
gone to individuals earning over $100,000, with 25.6 percent 
going to the $100,000 to $200,000 range. Joint Committee on 
Taxation, Preliminary Distributional Effect of Provisions affectillg 
High-Income Taxpayers (#D92-5 060 March 2, 1992), electroni-
cally reproduced 92 Tax Notes Today 49-14. Contrast the dis-
tributional effect of the House's 1992 indexing proposal (50 
to 60 percent to top). Senate Finance Committee Chairman 
Bentsen justified his progressive capital gains proviSion on 
its distributional impact, the mirror image of th e 
administration's. 138 Congo Rec. 53088 (Senate March 10,1992 
Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Chairman Bentsen , D-Te x.) 
("[administration's) proposal would have given 66 pt!rcent 
of the benefits to people with incomes over $200,000 - 66 
percent to less than 1 percent of the people. Our proposal 
gives 66 percent to those making under $100,000."); accord, 
id. at 3087 (same); 138 Congo Rec. S 3265-66 (Senate March 11, 
1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Chairman Bentsen). Moreover, 
Chairman Bentsen continued, the committee's top rate of 36 
percent was close to the top individual rate of 35 percent 
sought by President Reagan in 1985. ld. at S3266 (Senate 
March 11, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Chairman Bentsen). Senator Bob 
Packwood, R-Ore., Senate Finance Committee member, 
rejOined with a lecture on the difference between nominal 
rates and effec tive rates. ld . at 53266. The stronger argument 
wou ld have been that 35 percent had been the effective rate 
of the high-income taxpayers in the 1960s and 19705. Set' 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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Also, it still provides about one-third of its benefits to 
individuals a t or above the 31-percent bracket, but less 
than 10 percent to higher brackets. Since the progres-
sive capital gains rate would be so generous at the 
lower income tax brackets, J would make it elective and 
carry a toll charge - give up the inflation element of 
any investment interest incurred while holding the 
asset or of mortgage interest if gain on a residence were 
subject to the progressive rate. 
Anticipating that Congress will not be too interested 
in a progressive schedule due to its cost and failure to 
provide benefits to interest groups sponsored by the 
Democratic elements of the conservative coalition on 
capital gains, except for the small woodlot owner and 
farmer with recurring livestock sales, I would suggest, 
alternatively, simply excluding the first $3,500 or so of 
annual capital gain. Similar approaches were proposed 
by Senator Gaylord Nelson, O-Wis., in the 1970s, the 
Bush administration in 1989, and Rep. Rostenkowski 
in 1990 in his middle-income capital gains package. 
This amount probably does not exceed the average 
capital gain of the small capital gains realizer.28 Such 
gain is likely to be all inflation gain and be nonrecur-
ring at the bottom income tax brackets. This ceiling 
probably would cover 60 percent of the individuals 
reporting capital gains, but less than 20 percent of the 
annual realized gains. This flat exclusion could be 
phased out across the 31-percent bracket at the cost of 
simplicity, but would improve distributional aspects 
even more. 
II. SHELTERS, PROGRESSIVITY, COMPLEXITY 
A. Congressional Concerns 
In the March 17, 1993 continuing House Ways and 
Means hearing on President Clinton's economic plan, 
ABA Section of Taxation Chairman Albert O'Neill tes-
(Footnote 27 continued.) 
Nasar, "Who Paid the Most Taxes in the 80s? The Superrich," 
New York Times, Section 3, page 4, col. 1, at col. 2 (Sunday 
May 31, 1992) ("They paid an average of just 27 percent of 
their incomes to the Internal Revenue in 1989. In 1977, the 
earliest year for which Congressional Budget Office data are 
available, they paid a much heavier 36 percent.") . Moreover, 
due to depreciation recapture being taxed at 31 percent, twice 
as many taxpayers earning $200,000 and above would have 
an increase in income taxes as would have a decrease, and 
the aggregate increase would be about 150 percent of the 
aggregate decrease. See Preliminary Distributional Effect, supra. 
The outyear costs of indexing are reportedly enormous. 138 
Congo Rec. H607 (House Feb. 26, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of 
Rep. David Obey, D-Wis.) ("[AJfter five years the long· term 
costs of that capital gains gift, half of which goes to the super 
wealthy, will total $300 billion."); id. at H 615 (House Feb. 26, 
1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Rep. Anthony Beilenson, D-Cal.) 
(likely cost about $300 billion over next 20 years). 
281 adjusted the 1980 average gain of $2,000 to 1990 dollars. 
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tified that "[t]he American Bar Association has strongly 
supported the fundamental objectives of the 1986 act, 
and we continue to believe in the benefits to our tax 
system that flow from the Simplicity, efficiency and 
fairness created by a broad base with lower rates." He 
raised the specter of transactional complexity.29 House 
Ways and Means Chairman Rostenkowski displayed 
his true concern30 by asking O'Neill a different follow-
29"The proposed increase in ordinary income rates will 
create over 12-percent disparity in rates between capita l gains 
and ordinary income at the top end. We believe that this 
spread will be sufficient to cause high-income taxpayers to 
spend considerable time once again planning their transac-
tions so as to convert ordinary income into capital gains. The 
targeted capital gains proposals will obviously exacerbate the 
situation even more." 
3O"Chairman Rostenkowski: . .. I just remember the '86 
Act, when we got rid of a lot of these so-called incentives, 
and I'm not totally against it but I worry about whether or 
not we're starting on the road of another - the possibili ty 
of us having another fun on tax incentives that many of us 
consider loopholes unnecessary." March 10, 1993 House 
Hearings, supra (speaking of proposed temporary investment 
credit). 
The administration shared some of this concern with tax 
shelters: 
Secretary Bentsen: The package includes both tax incen-
tives and public investment expenditures. The tax side of the 
investment package includes two important provisions for 
small business, since small businesses are a major source of 
new jobs. 
First, small business will continue to enjoy the permanent 
investment tax credit that's introduced in the stimulus pack-
age, and second, we propose that inves tors in small corpora-
tions be able to exclude 50 percent of the gain in stocks held 
more than five years. 
This exclusion is carefully targeted to small growth com-
panies and to avoid abuse. Those were cited by the chairman 
a moment ago. The one concern is we're not trying to build 
up a bunch of tax loopholes or shelters in the process. 
ld. March 10,1993. The conservatives opposed the incen-
tives-cum-rate increases as well: 
Mr. Crane: Well, the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. 
What happens is you have a tax increase which s ucks out 
money from the system, reduces savings, reduces spending, 
therefore, reduces unemploymen t; and therefore, you have 
military reductions, which in turn reduce the employment in 
the military, which again increases unemployment. Then on 
the other hand, to offset that, you have tax incentives for a 
variety of different businesses, particularly the high-tech 
businesses on the west coast, and also you have spending 
programs. 
Why don't you just leave it alone so that you don't offset 
one problem with another, which is originally created when 
you increase the taxes and reduce the military? 
Id. March 9, 1993. 
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up question: what is the effect of the 13-point spread 
on tax shelter activities?31 The response was: not that 
much, given the continued barrier of the passive ac-
tivity loss limitations (PAL) of section 469.32 President-
elect Gordon of the New York State Society of CPAs 
observed at the same hearing that the bitter aftertaste 
of the 1980s shelter binge has eliminated much of the 
demand from passive investors for classic s helters. All 
of this calls for, however, steadfastness on the part of 
the administration and the tax-writing committee 
chairs in retaining (a) the narrowness of the new PAL 
exceptions for real estate people, (b) the limitations on 
the small-business corporation capital gains preference 
(particularly subject to one-half of the 50-percent exclu-
sion to the AMT), and (c) increasing individual AMT 
progressive rates to 26 percent and 28 percent. While 
some witnesses and Ways and Means members hauled 
out the hoary chestnut that high rates would cause a 
run on tax-exempts,33 there is a perhaps more real 
potential for abuse of income conversion through 
31"Chairman Rostenkowski . ... You' re all aware, of course, 
that the president vetoed what was incorporated as a tax 
simplification measure. Are any of you opposed to anything 
in the tax simplification measure that was introduced and that 
the president vetoed on the last two occasions? I gathered 
from most of your testimony that you're interested in tax 
simplification. 
"Mr. O'Neill, you point out in your testimony that the Tax 
Reform Act of '86 attempted to reduce economic distortions 
and to eliminate tax sheltering opportunities. As you also 
recognize, the administration's plan raises individual tax 
rates but leaves the maximum rate on capital gain at 28 
percent, thus creating a significant differential. 
"What effect do you really think this will have on tax 
shelter activities?" 
March 17, 1993 House Ways & Means Hearings. 
32"Well, in the traditional sense of tax shelters, with the 
other limitations that have already been imposed, including 
the passive loss limitations, I'm not sure in and of themselves 
that there will be that much of an impact on what I will call 
the traditional tax shelters. I think it's very clear that with a 
spread that we are looking at, that there will be a clear intent 
and for many taxpayers, complexity will be reintroduced 
about dealing with transactions, because people will want 
and will plan their affairs and try to come within the lower 
capital gains rates. So to the extent you consider a capital 
gains rate as a shelter, yes, obviously it will have an impact 
there." See also Emory, "Clinton Tax Plan Will Not Lead to 
Tax Shelter Mania," 59 Tax Noles 431 (April 19, 1993). 
33Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon raised this argument 
in favor of a flat 12Yl-percent individual capital gains rate in 
1921, even though he knew that wasn't all of the story for 
the fall -off in realizations at the top over the previous five 
years. 
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growth corporations, as evidenced by recent anecdotal 
evidence and hard evidence from the 1960s.34 
Also during the March 31, 1993 House Ways and 
Means hearing on Clinton's economic plan, witnesses 
representing various sma ll business interests generally 
spoke in favor of uniform tax increases to be used 
solely for deficit reduction35 and generally in opposi-
tion to restoration of preferences and high rates36 and, 
in particular, nickel-and-dime increases on specific in-
dustriesY But clearly, their most politically powerful 
argument was that imposition of high individual rates 
on income of passthrough entities, such as subchapter 
S corporations and partnerships, otherwise retained for 
expansion, would cost jobs,38 and the resulting disequi-
librium between top C corporation inside rates and top 
individual rates imposed on passthroughs would 
recreate transactional complexity in the choice of tax 
entity for small businesses as well as in financing .39 A 
workable compromise, for pass through entities a t 
34Rep. Robert Matsui, D-Calif., pointed out that the substan-
tial capital gains rate differential will have other consequences, 
"for example ... an effect on the issue of accumulated earnings, 
because it might be better for publiC corporations not to issue . 
. . [dividends) but instead keep the earnings so that it will inflate 
the value of stocks, so one would get capital gains treatment. . 
. . I received a call just the other day from an investment banker 
- an investment counselor from California, who indicated to 
me that he may ... (s tart adv ising clients to) shift assets from 
taxable bonds to nontaxable bonds and also high risk, high 
growth stocks .... " March 9,1993 House Ways and Means Hear-
ing. See also March 31 House Ways and Means Hearing tes-
timony of George Sydnor (High-yield tax-free fund); colloquy 
between Harry Sullivan and Rep . Nancy Johnson, R-Conn. 
Surrey's studies indicated that high-income individuals held on 
the average much lower than average dividend paying stocks. 
This fits also with the pattern of many high-income individuals 
churning on the public market. 
35March 31 House Ways and Means hearing testimony of 
Darryl Hartley-Leonard. 
36March 31 House Ways and Means hearing testimony of 
George Sydnor and Harry Sullivan. 
37March 31 House Ways and Means hearing testimony of 
Darryl Hartley-Leonard and colloquy with Rep. Charles Ran-
gel, D-N.Y. Witnesses George Sydnor and Harry Sullivan 
refused to make the choice when questioned by Rep . Michael 
Kopetski, D-Ore., opposing any tax increases. 
38March 31 House Ways and Means hearing testimony of 
George Sydnor (1.4 million S corporations); Harry Sullivan 
(sketches 1980s to present equilibrium between corporate 
and individual top income tax rates); Rep. Mel Hancock, 
R-Mo. (adopting [without attribution) Mark Mann 's 34-per-
cent cap on retained in expansion S corporation earnings 
with 5.6-percent spread imposed a t distribution); March 31 
House Ways and Means heari ng testimony of Mark Mann. 
See also March 25 Senate Finance Committee hearing tes-
timony of Michael Boskin, Ph.D. 
39March 31 House Ways and Means hea ring s tatements of 
Rep . Hancock in colloquy with George Sydnor and especially 
in colloquy with Mark Mann ("[WJouldn't the incentive be 
to take all of the money out [of a passthrough entity) ... even 
to the extent of borrowing money within the company [with 
deductible interest] to get his earnings out of there and invest 
that money in tax-frees and other potential capital gains like 
the stock market. .. . ?"). 
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least, derived from the Mann-Hancock proposal is dis-
cussed at Ill.D. below. 
B. 1950s-1980s Vertical and H orizon tal Disparities 
From the 19505 through the 19605, according to Stanley 
Surrey, then-assistant secretary of Treasury for tax 
policy, the principal means by which high-income tax-
payers achieved effective rates much lower than the 
nominal top rates was th rough the 50-percent capital 
gains exclusion, or more precisely, the maximum 25-
percent alternate rate, followed by interest.4o The same 
pattern held through the early 1970s. By 1983, however, 
the mix of sheltering deductions had changed, at least 
for high-income individuals with the lowest effective 
rates. In 1983, 11 percent of 260,000 high-income tax-
payers ($250,000 or more in total positive income (TPI» 
achieved effective rates of less than 5 percent of TPI 
(after 15 years of Congress attempting to curb shelters 
and assure that high-income individuals paid some 
minimum tax) .41 High-income taxpayers with below 
5-percent effective rates used the capital gains exclu-
sion and capital losses to offset only 46 percent of TPI. 
In contrast, they offset 67 percent of TPI with "business 
losses," and one-third of those losses were passed 
through from partnerships principally attributable to 
improved real estate.42 Sixty-four percent of these high-
income taxpayers used tax shelters.43 This shift was 
due in part to the backdoor consumption tax ACRS 
deduction for real estate depreciation, deregulation of 
lending institutions funding acquisition of real estate 
and overbuilding driven by speculation, and probably 
40Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform (Tax Reform , 1969) 
before the House Ways and Means Committee (Part 4), 91st Cong., 
1st Sess. 1592, 1598-9 (1969) (statement of Assistant Secretary 
Surrey); United States Treasury Department, Tax Reform Stl/dies 
and Proposals (Parts 1 and 2), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 84-6 and 
142-5, respectively (Comm. Print 1969). 
41By 1983, the effective rate of high-income individuals as 
a whole was down to 22 percent or so, which was the level 
only the taxpayers with $1 million income and large capital 
gains had achieved 20 years earlier when high-income in-
dividuals as a class had a 35-percent effective rate. Shelters, 
lowering the capital gains rate to 20 percent, and the top 
ordinary rate to 50 percent, thus dropped the effective rate 
at the top from 35 to 22 percent or so. 
42Hearing 011 High-Income Taxpayers and Related Partllership 
Tax Issues Before the HOl/se Ways and Means Subcommittee on 
Oversigllt, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-13 (1985) (Statement of 
Ronald Pearlman, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax 
Policy. "In 1983,51 percellt of all losses and only 14 percent 
of gains ... came from limi ted partnerships .... [T)hree 
categories of deductions, namely, interest, depreciation, and 
mineral exploration expenses, accounted for over 40 percent 
of all deductions - . . . which include wages and salaries, 
rents, and taxes .. .. For the sheer magnitude of losses, real 
estate operators and lessors of buildings dominate all other 
industries. Although their gross income is about one-third of 
the total for all partnerships, they account for one-half of the 
depreciation deductions and 55 percent of the interest ex-
pense." rd. Chicago Law Professor Shaviro makes the inter-
esting and plausible point that the late 1970s heating up of 
shelters may have been encouraged by the widespread 
publicity in 1969 and then in 1976 about tax shelters. 
431d. at 7. 
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p ublicity about tax shelters as Congress enacted a 
series of ineffectual restrictions on tax shelters. I 
suspect that higher effective rate high-income in-
dividuals, say 5-percent to 20-percent effective rate, 
used the capital gains preference more and tax shelter 
preferences less. 
During the 1980s boom, the greatest increase in 
source of income among high-income individuals over-
all was capital gains - a 171-percent increase in capital 
gains44 (largely a consequence of the boom stock 
market trebling and leveraged buyouts, but also the 
real estate boom), but only a 100-percent increase in 
before-tax income overal1.45 Couple that increase with 
a cut in their effective rate from 35 percent on the 
average to the mid to high 20s on the average, while 
the average income at the lower brackets stagnated or 
declined even though average hours worked increased 
and effective rates, taking into account payroll taxes, 
stayed the same or increased, and you have the major 
justification in the Clinton campaign for restoration of 
some progressivity in the code .4b 
C. 1986 Code: Low Rates and Broad Base 
Tax shelters were classically defined in 1975 by the 
JCT as consisting of (a) deferral of income through 
44136 Congo Rec. 8321 (House Sept. 28, 1990 Daily Ed.) 
(remarks of Rep. Tom Downey, D-N.Y.) . 
45House Ways and Means Majority Staff, Tax Progressivity 
and Il1come Distribution, 101st Cong., 1s t Sess. 2-4, 12-13 
(House Ways and Means Comm. Print 1990); Joint Committee 
on Taxation Staff, Tax Policy and the Macroeconomy: Stabi-
lization, Growth and Distribution, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 29·30, 
55 (House Ways & Means Comm. Print 199]). See generally 
M. Kaus, The Elld of Equality 29-32 (Basic Books 1992). 
46"The economic philosophy of this administration is that 
you make the economy grow by putting more and more 
wealth into the hands of fewer and fewer people at the top, 
getting government out of the way, and trusting them to 
make the right decisions to invest and to create jobs. I believe 
the way to make our economy grow is to invest in our people 
- our children's education, our workers' skills, our families' 
health care - (applause) - our plant and equipment, our 
best ideas in research and development. They believe that 
you make an economy grow by putting money first ; I believe 
you make an economy grow in a global economy by putting 
people first . (Cheers, applause.) You can chart the differences 
between us by seeing who has won and who has lost, who 
has been helped and who has gotten hurt while this crowd 
has run our government over the last twelve years. For 12 
years they have rewarded people who cut deals and cut 
corners, who make money by pushing paper instead of those 
who make money by investing in new plants, new equip-
ment, new businesses - those who work hard, play by the 
rules, and pay their taxes. And for the first time since the 
Roaring '20s, the top 1 percent of the American people now 
control more wealth than the bottom 90 percen t. But while 
the rich have been winners, no American would have 
begrudged them that since we all want in this free enterprise 
system to at least believe our children might grow up to be 
rich. No one would have begrudged that if the rest of us had 
been helped. But in 1980 we had the highest wages in the 
world. Now we're 13th. The census document itself shows 
that most Americans are working longer work weeks for 
lower wages, paying higher taxes on lower income, paying 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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accelerated deductions based on total cost, (b) leverage 
or deduction of interest paid in financing the business, 
and (c) conversion or realization of gain attributable to 
such ordinary deductions at capital gains ratesY Early 
attempts to curb tax shelters, such as section 1250 
recapture of "excess" depreciation as to real estate im-
provements enacted in 1964, the minitax antecedent to 
the individual AMT enacted as part of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969, the "at risk" provisions enacted in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, and the House-passed limitation 
on artificial accounting losses in 1975, focused on the 
source of the preferential deductions or the type of 
financing . They were largely ineffective (as witnessed 
by the drop in the effective rate at the top from the 
mid-1970s to the early 1980s) mostly because improved 
real estate always received at most a slight slap on the 
wrist. The 1986 code focused instead on stopping an 
individual who does not "materially participate" in an 
active business, including by definition rental real es-
tate, from offsetting the business's losses, regardless of 
source, against the individual's compensation or 
portfolio income.48 The means chosen to halt this tax 
sheltering was the PAL limitations, not the elimination 
of the capital gains preference. Front-end leverage and 
deferral elements from accelerated preferences were 
more important to classic ta x shelters than back-end 
capital gains.49 
Conventional wisdom claims that the 1986 code 
created a compact of low rates paid for by a broader 
base, i.e., less preferences.so Businesses that had gotten 
used to the level playing fieid sl complained in 1993 of 
(Footnote 46 continued.) 
a bigger percentage of their income for housing and for 
health care, and yes, for education. Today the United States 
Commerce Department issued its report on adjusted figures 
for 1991 in which it says that in 1991 there was a 2 percent 
real drop in the incomes of the American people, the first 
drop since 1982, the worst drop in over 30 years. I will say 
that again. Inflation was 4.4 percent, incomes went up 2.2 
percent, there was a 2 percent decline in the workings - in 
the earnings of the American people even though they 
worked more hours than the year before or the decade before. 
And the average family is actually spending more hours on 
the job than they were 20 years ago." 
Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton re: Education and 
Economics at Montgomery College, Rockville, Md. Sept. 2, 
1992. 
47Joint Comm. Staff, Overview of Tax Shelters 1 (1975). 
48Cf. Joint Comm. Staff, Federal Income Tax Treatment of 
Pass-through Entities 15 (Hearing Pamphlet 1986). 
49Cooper, "The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and 
Controlling Income Tax Avoidance," 85 Collim. L. Rev. 657 
(1985). 
50March 31 House Ways and Means Hearing testimony of 
George Sydnor and Harry Sullivan. 
sl"Level playing field" was the simile used by Treasury 
for economic efficiency in the development of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. 
1408 
reintroduction of high rates and preferences,52 the Clin-
ton formula for "growing the economy."S) Witnesses at 
the March 31, ]993 House Ways and Means hearings 
espoused the view that the glue to the 1986 act was 
that everybody bore some pain. In fact, it was less that 
everybody bore equal pain, particularly on the in-
dividual side, and more that the drastically lowered 
top rate (50 percent to 28 percent/33 percent) required 
offsetting high-income individual-specific pain, in the 
form of repeal of any capital gains preference greater 
than 28 percent and of deductions for consumer inter-
est, and enactment of the PAL limitation on tax-shelter 
deductions and the "bubble" 33-percent rate on the 
near rich for distributional equity.54 
As House Ways and Means Committee member 
Charles Rangel, D-N.Y., pointed out in the March 31 
House Ways and Means hearings, the 1986 code froze 
in place the late-1970s to early-1980s erosion of 
progressivity. Senate Finance Committee member Bill 
Bradley, D-N.J., admitted this earlier and would agree 
S2March 31 House Ways and Means Hearing testimony of 
George Sydnor ("Before 1986, the tax system had grown gross-
ly unfair. The numerous preferences which complicated the 
code created very wide disparities in the effective tax rates 
paid by various industries . NAW considers the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 to be the most important piece of tax legislation 
passed in the 47-year history of O Uf organiza tion, because 
market forces, rather than public policy no matter how skill-
fully crafted, can best determine investment decisions .... 
[TJax preferences are like drugs, sir. From 1986 to 1991 we had 
withdrawal trauma. Now, we have learned to live with this, 
and we have learned to play on a level playing fi eld . If we 
reintroduce tax preferences, that takes away the underpin -
nings of the '86 Act and what it was founded upon - and th is 
was low rates with few breaks.") and Harry Su llivan ("The 
Tax Reform Action Coalition was formed in June of 1985 by 
business associations and corporations which were com-
mitted to enacting federal tax reform which would substan-
tially reduce the then exis ting high statutory ind ividual and 
corporate tax rates in return for the reduction of preferences 
in the code ... . The Tax Reform Act of 1986 represented much 
more than a revamping of the tax code. It represented a victory 
of principle over spec ial interes t, and demonstrated that 
American poliCies can work to the benefit of all of the people, 
not just the chosen few . . . . TRAC's unifying glue that holds 
this together, is that all of these businesses and individuals 
usi ng their after-tax dollars will make the bes t market 
decisions . ... ") . 
53 President Clinton 's remarks to the U.s. Chamber of 
Commerce's 1993 National Business Action Rally, Feb. 23, 
1993 ("I have offered a plan ... that cuts spending with real 
specific cuts, not rhetoric about overall caps, with tax in-
creases that I believe are progressive, although none are free 
of pain. And with targeted, specific investments to grow this 
economy."). 
s4Kies, "The Current Political, Budgetary, and Tax Policy 
Environment Suggests the Possibility of Major Tax Legisla -
tion in the 100th Congress," 35 Tax Notes 179 (April 13, 1987). 
In theory, increases on the corporate side were to partially 
pay for the rate decreases on the individual s ide. See Lee, 
"Entity Classification and Integra tion : Publicly Traded 
Partnerships, Persona I Serv ice Co rpora tion and the Tax 
Legislative Process," 8 Va. Tax Rev. 57, 71 -2 (1988). 
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with raising the top rates so long as he could agree 
with the use of the resulting revenues.55 Therefore, if 
Congress can now raise the ordinary income tax rates 
at the top without restoring that much of the old 
preferences, the liberal element of the bipartisan coali-
tion will rejoin partisan Democrats. Remember, the 
bipartisan coalition of conservatives favoring low 
rates, and liberals favoring lower preferences, passed 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 for different reasons.56 
The case for increasing the income tax rates at the 
top without really restoring that much of the old 
preferences rests on the case for restoring part of the 
late 1970s to early 1980s erosion of progressivity at the 
top from 35 percent to the 20s. Essentially that case is 
that Congress cut the rates at the top in a trickledown 
experiment that failed; therefore, the old effective rate 
at the top should be restored. Bill Clinton campaigned 
for the presidency in part on this argument. 
D. Revival of Old-Time Tax: Sheltering Unlikely 
With a generic capital gains rate of 28 percent and 
PAL relaxed only as to real estate professionals (with 
the revenue losses being offset by lengthening the 
depreciable "life" of commercial real estate improve-
ments - I would prefer using full section 1250 recap-
ture first as discussed below), and the bitter aftertaste 
of the 1980s tax shelter implosion still lingering, tradi-
tional tax shelters will not likely come back in force as 
the chairman of the ABA Section of Taxation testified 
in the March 17, 1993 House Ways and Means hearing. 
I would add, as well, the factors of a 20-percent nation-
wide vacancy rate in office space and bust in real estate 
values following the 1980s bubble57 and attendant in-
ability to obtain bank financing for real estate pur-
chases and construction.58 
I unders tand, based on anecdotal evidence from 
practitioners and government officials, that PAL has 
effectively curbed the use of tax shelters by passive 
investors. The proposed loosening of the PAL 
provisions affects only "real estate professionals," i.e., 
"more than half of the personal services the taxpayer 
performs in a trade or business during the taxable year 
55Cloud, "Bradley Sounds Warning Bells as 1986 Tax Deal 
Unravels," 51 Congo Q. Wkly Rept. 739 (March 27, 1993). For 
earlier indications of Senator Bradley's willingness to raise the 
rate at the top if not accompanied by a capital gains giveback, 
see 136 Congo Rec. S 15769 (Senate October 18, 1990 Daily Ed.); 
138 Congo Rec. S 3103 (Senate March 10, 1992 Daily Ed.). Joseph 
Minarik explained that such freezing was intended to widen 
the political support for the consensus Bradley built for the 
lowering of the rates through curbing of preferences notion, 
which underlay the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Minarik, "How 
Tax Reform Came About," 37 Tax Notes 139 (Dec. 28, 1987). 
56Bittker, "Tax Reform - Yesterday, Today and Tomor-
row," 44 Washington & Lee L. Rev. 11, 14 (1987) (liberals moved 
by fairness or horizontal equity and conservatives by 
economic efficiency or level playing field). 
57138 Congo Rec. 53378 (Senate March 12, 1993 Daily Ed.) 
(Remarks of Senator Bill Bradley, D-N.J.). 
58"ln Search of Borrowers," The Economist 71 (April 3, 
1993) (since peak in 1987, commercial property values have 
probably halved and so banks have been refusing to accept 
commercial property as collateral). 
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are in real property trades or businesses in which he 
materially participates." The stated reason was the 
"disadvantage" that real estate professionals under 
current section 469 may not use "losses arising from 
the rental of real property .. . to offset income from 
other aspects of the taxpayer's real estate business . .. . 
[O]ther business professionals ... are allowed to 
deduct losses from activities in which they materially 
participate." I understand from further anecdotal 
evidence that IRS field agents looking for adjustments 
under section 469 must perforce focus on real estate 
professionals or quasi-professionals, since the true pas-
sive investors had long ago dropped out, particularly 
if their capital contributions were called for in annual 
stages. In any event, Congress passed this provision 
last year in the vetoed H .R. 4210. Its cost, while not 
that cheap at $2.2 billion over the five-year revenue 
window, is to be paid for by lengthening the" depreci-
able" life for real estate to 40 or so years, which would 
raise $2.4 billion over the window. This reduces the 
annual section 168 deduction for real estate from 
around 3 percent to 2.5 percent per year on a 
straightline basis. When one considers that the first 
1984 Treasury report would have provided under its 
indexed system a 3-percent deduction for 63 years, 59 
this seems unfair. Of course, this Treasury report would 
at the same time have reduced a real estate owner's 
interest deduction by the rate of inflation while increas-
ing the owner's depreciable basis for inflation (which 
is why 3 percent for 60 odd years works as long as 
inflation averages 3 percent or more). 
A fairer policy answer, assuming the revenue is 
there or in conjunction with a less harsh useful life for 
real estate improvements, would be to tax all real estate 
section 1231 and perhaps section 1221 "capital gains" 
of real estate professionals as full ordinary income, at 
least to the extent of losses so exempted under PAL, 
i.e., a real estate recapture rule that really works. The 
logic supporting this linkage of PAL exception and 
ordinary income upon disposition is manifested by a 
comparison of (a) the definition in the legislative his-
tory of the 1986 act of "material participation," viz., 
involvement on a "regular, continuous and substantial 
basis" with (b) a classic definition of trade or business 
status barring capital gains treatment contained in Fahs 
V. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1947), viz. , "Carry-
ing on a business . . . implies an occupational undertak-
ing to which one habitually devotes time, attention, or 
effort with substantial regularity." 
Alternatively, full recapture under section 1250 of 
all prior depreciation up to gain should be enacted . The 
original reason stated in 1964 for limiting depreciation 
recapture under section 1250 as to improved real estate 
to the excess of accelerated depreciation over 
straightline was that real estate was held longer than, 
for example, machinery, and hence, was more subject 
to inflation.60 The truth was the real estate lobby chose 
this 1964 slap on the wrist while giving up (a) ration-
592 Treasury Department Report to the President, Tax Reform 
for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 161 (1984). 
60S. Rep . No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess . 132 (1964) . 
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alization of useful Jives, and (b) the investment tax 
credit, which personal property had obtained in 1962 
as part of a package including full recapture under 
section 1245 for depreciation taken up to gain real-
ized.61 Now that a n investment tax credit for personal 
property will not be enacted, real estate and personal 
property will be treated more alike if a shorter life than 
proposed by the administration for rea l estate is ob-
tained. In that event, full recapture under section 1250 
on the model of section 1245 with no offsets should 
apply to all dispositions of improved real estate up to 
depreciation taken even b y nonprofessionals if a 
generic 28-percent capital gains rate applies to section 
1231 assets. Compare the 1992 administration 
proposals. A compromise might be to limit the rate 
increase to the 36 percent or even the 39.6-percent rate 
rather than the 41-percent rate at the top with PEP and 
Pease. Someone active enough in real estate activities 
to escape PAL should not be able to obtain capital gains 
treatment (including section 1231) as to improved rea l 
estate used in those activities. 
E. Implicit Rule of 28 
A member of Congress once said that the best thing 
to come out of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the 
individual AMT rate of then 21 percent, now 24 per-
cent, and hopefully soon a graduated 26 percent to 28 
percent. I don't regard it as the Single best thing, but 
as part of a troika, with PAL and repeal of the capital 
gains preference, that worked to assure that most high-
income individual taxpayers wou ld be taxed a t much 
the same effective rate . All other income g roups 
clustered around the mean. High-income taxpayers 
alone manifested a range from a zero effec ti ve rate to 
just below the top nominal rate, as discussed in ll.B . 
above. 
In short, the '86 act effected horizontal equi ty, not a 
change in vertical equity. Thus, with an average effec-
tive rate at the top in the high 20s, a maximum capital 
gains rate of 28 percent, a top rate at 28 percent (ac-
tually 33 percent with the original bubble rate), and an 
AMT of 21 percent, most taxpayers at the top would 
be taxed in the high 20s one way or another. Raising 
the AMT rate to a two-step graduated rate with a top 
rate of 28 percent and keeping the generic capital gains 
rate at 28 percent are further steps towards horizontal 
equity. The 42-percent or so top ordinary rate, however, 
will result in some gain in vertical equity, but a cost of 
some, but perhaps not a major, loss in horizontal equity. 
This horizontal inequity is an inevitable byproduct of 
the administration's avowed policy of using the code 
to implement industrial policy, i.e., growing the 
61 Hearings all the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations before 
the HOllse Ways and Means Committee, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 995, 
997 (1961); see also S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 
(1962) . 
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economy through marginal incentives.62 In this context, 
the proposed targeted small-business preference must 
maintain its proposed limitations as well (particularly 
subjecting one-half of the 50-percent preference to the 
AMT) or both vertical and horizontal equity will be 
gravely a t risk.63 If the net proposals increase the high-
income effective rate and do not create that much 
deviation from that effective rate from renewed 
preferences, liberals in Congress shou ld support the 
proposed rate increase cum limited preferences. After 
all, Clinton won a mandate on higher rates at the top, 
and he a lways plugged targeted small-business prefer-
ences on the s tump . 
F. Increased Complexity, but Only at the Margin 
Complexity in transactional tax planning, i.e., con-
verting services or portfolio income into capital gains, 
undoubtedly will increase with the reintroduction of a 
substantial capital gains preference. This seems to be 
the tax bar's main concern, which is not surprising, 
since this is the corner of capi tal transac tions on which 
tax planners are called to provide advice. But transfor-
mation of income, perhaps other than through growth 
stocks, is at the margins in terms of revenue, as Trea-
sury was surprised to discover in the 1960s.64 My es-
timates, derived from early 1960s and late 1970s Trea-
sury data, of the li kely breakdown of types of capita l 
gains annual income show the reasons why : 45 percent 
62"The tax program, as you know, is highly progressive, 
and some say tha t it is so progressive that it will discourage 
people from reinvesting. I would just ask you to stud y the 
whole thing . We provide for the first time in the history of the 
country a permanent investment tax credit for small busi-
nesses for 90 percent of the employers who have 40 percent 
of the workers but create a majority of the jobs in this country. 
We provided alterna ti ve minimum tax relief for the big capi-
tal-intensive businesses of this count ry who have told us 
repeatedly that the alternative minimum tax treatment in the 
present tax code actually discourages people from making 
investments. We have provided some relief from the passive 
loss provisions of the income tax code for people who are in 
the real estate business, beca use I think that has aggravated 
the condition not only of real estate but of some of our banks 
and con tributed to the credit crunch. So I think there will be 
both direct benefits to real estate and indirect benefits to 
people who have to get bank financing by changing thi s pas-
sive loss provision .... So I ask you to look at it as a whole 
package, and to recognize that. We have to aga in mov e away 
from a tax system that is based too much on fixed-rate taxes 
like excise and payroll taxes, more toward income t,'\Xes that 
have also offsetting incentives to invest. I believe that this is 
the proper direction to go." 
Clinton's Chamber of Commerce speech, Silpra. 
63CBO Director Robert Reischauer fears that Clinton's in-
centives partially offsetting the rate increases might not 
themselves undo the 1986 act, but "they might be the 
'dynamic' to set its overthrow in motion ." Jakubowicz, "Reis-
chauer Worried Clinton Plan May Undo Tax Reform, " 1993 
Tax Noles Today 86-1 (April 20, 1993). I would hope that the 
pay-as-you-go principle would retard such tendency. 
64Hearings on Presidenl's 1963 Tax Message before Ihe HailS': 
COlllmittee all Ways alld Mealls (Part 2), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 
606 (1963) (Statement of Secretary of the Treasury Douglas 
Dillon) . 
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public stock, 5 percent close corporations, 25 percent 
real estate, 15 percent installment sales (mostly busi-
nesses and land), 1 or 2 percent livestock, 1 or 2 percent 
timber and coal royalties, etc. Transactional costs from 
complexity, in theory, would reduce aggressive capital 
gains planning at the margin. My guess is that effecting 
any such trend would require the Service to focus 
audit, technical advice, litigation, and ultimately "sub-
stantial authority" attention to the conversion areas, 
should they redevelop rather than focus almost ex-
clusively on real estate as in the past. Section 14206 of 
H.R. 2141, OBRA 1993, which treats gains from certain 
ostensible sales of capital assets as ordinary income 
where the economic substance is indistinguishable 
from a loan in terms of risk and return, is narrower 
than the traditional conversion transactions en-
couraged by a significant differential between top capi-
tal and ordinary rates. Such opportunities were first 
described by then-Special Tax Adviser to Treasury Ran-
dolph Paul in 1942 in 1942 Hearings on Revenue Revision 
Before the House Ways and Means Committee (Part 2), 77th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1630-31 (1942), and closely examined 
by Professor Stanley Surrey, first in the 1955 Joint 
Economic Committee Hearings held by Tax Policy Sub-
committee Chairman Rep. Wilbur Mills, D-Ark., and 
then in "Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxa-
tion," 69 Ham. L. Rev. 985 (1956), and in the 1959 Tax 
Revision Compendium. 
G. Do Tax Incentives Really Work Anyway? 
Chairman Rostenkowski: Well, Dr. Tyson, we 
wrote a tax bill here that was in the minds of 
many of us a simplification bill. Do you fill out 
your own income tax? 
Dr. Tyson: No, I have an accountant fill out my 
income tax. 
Chairman Rostenkowski: Well, I read all your 
suggestions and I'm not suggesting that I dis-
agree with this. But, the fact of the matter is, 
investment tax credits, capital gains, enterprise 
zones, are we going to muck up the code at all? 
Dr. Tyson: I think what we're trying to do here 
is to find a way to use the tax system to encourage 
those kinds of economic activities which the 
country most needs right now. 
Now, using the tax system in a targeted way 
does indeed make the tax system more compli-
cated. So, my answer to that would be that we're 
trying to strike a balance here between more 
simplification, which would of course make it 
easier, and incentives that are targeted. 
Chairman Rostenkowski: I don't want to dis-
agree with that. I think that if we can target areas 
where we have a slump in the economy or a prob-
lem in the industry that we ought to do some-
thing like. 
But, as I've been sitting on this committee, it 
almost comes into focus that once you give busi-
ness or the taxpayer a break in an area - like an 
incentive - there's no way you can rescind that 
incentive. I mean, it's like a sick patient. You 
know, once you give them all the medicine and 
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they get cured and you send them out of the 
hospital, they don't take the medicine anymore. 
But, American business starts making this a 
part of doing business. That's what I always 
worry about. I, for one, feel I'd like the private 
sector to do a lot more. If government, in this 
committee, we can create an atmosphere where 
they're going to do more, once they're well and 
active, we can take that away. 
It's always been here, whenever you recom-
mend you're going to do something for a five-
year period, about in the second year, th e 
business community is sitting down there saying, 
" Well , can you give us another extension for four 
more years." Now it's not five years, it's nine 
years. 
That's what worries me about this. I think that 
it is a bold package. I've endorsed it. I just hope 
that when we eliminate the deficit or curtail our 
spending, that we're broad enough to understand 
that good business, in my opinion, makes invest-
ment when the time and climate is right and not 
because we give them incentives. 
March 9, 1993 House Ways and Means Hearing.6s A 
witness at the March 25, 1993 Senate hearings pointed 
out that studies indicate that incentives are not the 
determinative factor in capital expenditures anyway.66 
Corporate interest groups rejected a narrow invest-
ment tax credit that would give back only a fraction of 
65See Jakubowicz, "Rosty to Administration: 'Are You 
Going to Muck Up the Code?" 93 Tax Notes Today 55-3 (March 
15, 1993). 
66"1 think the - my experience and some of the studies, 
particularly some current studies by Professor Kasari at the 
Washington University of 51. Louis, point out that the cost of 
capital is ordinarily not as big a factor in determining invest· 
ment as is generally believed. 
I think the bigger factors are cash flow or profitability and 
sales growth." 
Unofficial Transcript of Finance Hearing on Deficit Reduc-
tion March 25, 1993 (Statement of S.J . Levy, Chairman, the 
Jerome Levy Institute, Bard College). Senate Finance Com-
mittee Chairman Moynihan, D-N .Y., added anecdotal 
evidence. 
The Chairman. We have respectable anecdotal evidence ... . 
[W]hen you ask a group of businessmen what makes them 
decide to build a plant .... The only thing Ira asks is, "Can I 
sell the damned stuff?" Id. 
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the revenues from a two-point increase for the top 2,700 
corporations with over $10 million in profits.67 
III. PROGRESSIVE RATES AND SMALL BUSINESSES 
A. The Imbalance Between Inside and 
Outside Rates 
Beginning in the mid-1930s, when Congress enacted 
(a) the graduated "inside" corporate income tax rate, 
thereby decoupling the rate for small businesses from 
the rate for large corporations, and (b) a soon-to-be-
repealed tax on undistributed corporate profits, the 
small-business inside corporate rate was far below the 
maximum outside rate on individuals. Double taxation 
was largely a myth, since dividends were rarely paid 
by close corporations and retained earnings were real-
ized at the shareholder level (if the business was sold 
before death) in the form of capital gains. These rules, 
together with the codified General Utilities doctrine 
(under which a liquidating corporation was not taxed 
on unrealized capital appreciation as to assets dis-
tributed pursuant to the liquidation or sold pursuant 
to a "timely" liquidation) resulted in less taxation than 
if the business were conducted directly, as Congress 
was repeatedly told in hearings.68 
In short, the dose C corporation has long obtained 
preferential rates for small (currently up to $50,000 to 
$75,000) annual profits reinvested in the business. Until 
1981, a smaller preference (around 50 percent inside 
versus 70 percent outside) even was provided for larger 
incomes. But the Tax Reform Act of 1986 established a 
new "equilibrium" at higher levels of retained earnings 
with a maximum permanent inside corporate rate of 
34 percent and a maximum permanent outside in-
dividual rate of 28 percent.69 Actually, it mostly 
67"1 would like to recommend and I am recommending to 
the committee on behalf of the coalition, that we not increase 
the corporate rates and that we be very, very careful as we 
look at the individual rates, and in particular, if all that rate 
increase means is that you are going to tum around and take 
$3 and give back a dollar of some kind of incentive, then Jeave 
the incentive out. ... I think you set up a condition that brings 
out behavior that isn't in the best interests of the economy or 
individual firms. You start with a premise that we are going 
to increase the rates and then remove it and say, well, wait, 
the rate stays but we don't give you the crumbs, then I think 
everybody has got to say, listen we want to get back anything 
we can get back. But the premise is short of faulty to set up 
that inefficient - it is not going to do an awful lot for busi-
nesses except create some jobs in accounting and it is going 
to create a lot of Tax Revenue Agent jobs." March 31 House 
Ways and Means hearing testimony of Harry Sullivan. Data 
as to impact of two-point increase in the top corporate rate is 
from testimony by Secretary of Treasury Bentsen at February 
24, 1993 Senate Finance Committee hearing on Clinton's 
economic proposal. 
68See authorities cited in Lee, supra note 54, at 95 note 141, 
69 At the same time, Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 increased the base for the lowest corporate rates (15 
percent) from $25,000 to $50,000 in retained income, ap-
parently in response to the complaint of small business as to 
the first 1984 Treasury Report's elimination of the graduated 
corporate rate. See Birnbaum & Murray, Showdown at Gucci 
Gulch 80 (1987). 
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reversed the prior disequilibrium between top cor-
porate and individual rates . With this new imbalance 
favoring direct taxation of the owner at annual retained 
income in excess of $100,000, the number of 5 corpora-
tions grew from around 500,000 to 1,500,000 or more70 
out of 3,500,000 or so active corporations. The proposed 
increase in individual rates to 36 percent and around 
41 percent while the top corporate rate for all but the 
biggest corporations (2,700 with $10 million in profits) 
remains at 34 percent would shift the balance back to 
"growth" C corporations for larger retained earnings,?1 
B. Politics 
The impact of the proposed rate increases on small-
business owners is an important political issue. In the 
1992 congressional debate on similar rate increases (al-
though starting at considerably higher break points for 
the 36-percent bracket and millionaire's surtax), Trea-
sury and conservatives claimed that they would bear 
as much as 70 percent of the burden of the rate increase.72 
Senate Finance Chairman Lloyd Bentsen, O-Tex ., then 
70Publication 16, Statistics of Income, 1989 Corporate Income 
Tax Returns, pp. 4, 9, indica tes that for 1989 there were 
1,422,967 S corporation returns out of 3,627,863 corporate 
returns, up from 1,257,191 in 1988, U27,905 in 1987, and 
826,216 in 1986. Thus, by now, there may well be 2 million S 
corporations. 
71March 31 House Ways and Means hearing testimony of 
Harry Sullivan. "One of the things that we talked about in 
this double taxation - we start today from a snapshot where 
there is the top corporate rate is 34; the individual rate is 31. 
So the corporate rate is three points higher. For many people 
in the public, as well as some people in the Congress they 
think it has always been that way. It has only been since 1988 
and '87 that the corporate rate was higher than the individual 
rate. That is how you got away from a little bit of the double 
taxation. The rate right now, the three-pOint negative spread, 
with the corporate higher - it was six - when we did the 
transition after the '86 Act, it was 1.5 points. The corporate rate 
was 40; the maximum individual was 38. Pre '86 that differen-
tial was four points; where the corporate rate was four points 
lower. So there has been an equilibrium between Ss and sub-
chapter C corporations and individual rates. We have lived 
now for six years with that equilibrium or with the new equi-
librium - the only time since 1909 that the corporate rate was 
higher than the individual rate - 1987 on." 
720n the House floor in Winter 1992, members of Congress 
opposing the House Democrats' proposed rate increase to 35 
percent, distorting statistics, argued that 90 percent of the 
impact of the new high-income rates would fall on small 
businesses conducted as pass- through entities, i.e., a farm, 
sole proprietorship, partnership, or a subchapter S corpora-
tion. E.g., 138 Congo Reg. H 449 (House Feb. 19, 1992 Daily Ed.) 
(Remarks of Rep . McCollum, R-Fla.). This number was far too 
high, reflecting the percentage of all business enterprises that 
pass-through entities constituted on a per capita basis, rather 
than the percentage of total annual reported income of all 
high-income individuals that small-business people reported 
(and even then at higher income levels small-business tax-
payers may have substantial amounts of investment income). 
The Senate debate in March 1992 delineated the issue. Treasury 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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disputed the accuracy of such estimates/3 and now as 
Clinton's Secretary of Treasury, has come up with his own 
statistics - only 4.2 percent of sma11-business people 
will see an ordinary income rate increase.74 Based on 
(Footnote 72 continued.) 
and Senate Republicans claimed that "approx.imately 70 per-
cent of those who would have been affected by the tax rate 
increases proposed by Congress in the failed tax reform. package 
are farmers and those in sole proprietorships, S corporations, and 
partnerships. More than $40 billion in revenue would have come 
from higher taxation of S corporations alone . . . . " Speech by 
Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Fred T. Gold~erg 
Jr., former Commissioner, speaking at the Tax Executives 
Institute's midyear conference March 30,1991, in Washington, 
D.C., quoted in Zeidner, "Goldberg Says Tax Increases Hurt 
Small Businesses, Stall Job Creation," 92 Tax Notes Today 69-1; 
accord, 138 Congo Rec. 53270 (Senate March 11, 1992 Daily Ed.) 
(Remarks of Senator Dominici, R-N .M.) (?O to 65 perce.nt of t.he 
tax increase will be added to returns With small-busmess m-
come). The 5 corporation "share" thus would have constituted 
about 42 percent of the total increase. 
73Chairman Bentsen correctly criticized Treasury's 70 per-
cent as counting every partner in 1985 as a small business 
person. Most partners were members of tax she.lter partner-
ships at this time and most were not small-busmess people 
(as contrasted with professionals whom many members of 
Congress no longer regard as favored small businesse~) and 
profitable partnerships probably are concentrated. m the 
professions as well (accountants and attorneys) and m stock 
brokerage houses - and very few sole proprietors or .in-
dividual farmers come within the high income categones. 
Similarly,S corporations, particularly those formed after 1987, 
include many professional corporations. See 138 Congo Rec. 
53281 (Senate Ma.rch 11, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Chairman 
Bentsen) ("What the administration has done is most mislead-
ing. Roughly two-thirds of those affect~ b'y ~he new fourth 
bracket are small business. What they did IS Include all tax· 
payers who reported income from sole proprietorships,S c?r-
porations, farms, and partnerships. ~e last two ~atego~les 
contain many taxpayers with net busmess losses, Includmg 
many tax shelters. So I do not believe that is a representative 
statement. The way the administration put the numbers together 
I think brings about a situation which is not representative:"); id. 
at 53652 (Senate March 13, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Chairman 
Bentsen); id. at S 4009, S 4020 (Senate March 20, 1992 (Remarks 
of Chairman Bentsen in Conference Debate). 
74Mr. Bentsen. Well, this plan is definitely pro-small busi-
ness. We heard some arguments last year. And I pointed out 
to many Senators who were inaccurately using num~ers. I 
am even more familiar with these numbers now for thiS last 
year. We have them for the last year from Treasury. So let's 
present the data. 
First of all, it is unreasonable to assume that every person 
with more than one dollar of business income on their return 
is a small-business person. Second, only a small percentage 
of small-business owners are affected. 
To determine if the taxpayer is a bona fide small-business 
person, it is reasonable to look only at those. taxpay~rs who 
had active business income that exceeded theIr wage mcome. 
And of the nearly seven million taxpayers with business 
income in excess of their wages, only 300,000 or 4.2 percent 
would face higher marginal rates. 
February 24, 1993 Senate Finance Committee Hea.ring. 
These computations apparently understate small-busmess 
taxpayers who draw out most of the corporate profit as com-
pensation in either a C or 5 corporation. 
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widely cited unofficial estimates by a private firm 
providing financial planning for high-income tax-
payers, it seems that small-business people make up 
approximately 16 percent of taxpayers at the 31-per-
cent bracket, 20 percent or so at the $250,000 surtax 
level, and somewhere in between for the 36-percent 
bracket.7s r suspect that these percentages are close to 
the actual burden of the individual rate increases on 
small-business people. Moreover, at the higher income 
levels, half of the income is from passive sources -
interest, dividends, and capital gains. 
7SFortune put business owners at only 18 percent (and 
CEOs at 31 percent) of the top I percent by in.come in 1~91. 
The top 1 percent consisted in 1991 of the followmg categon~ : 
(1) corporate executives, 31 percent (down from 44 percent m 
1981); (2) business owners, 18 percent (down from 24 percent); 
attorneys, 13 percent (down from 19 percent); (3) doctors and 
dentists, 15 percent (up from 10 percent); and (4) others (such 
as sports stars, actors, and consultants), 23 percent (up ~ro~ 
3 percent). Fisher, "The New Debate Over the Very Rich, 
Fortune 42, 44 (June 29, 1992) (source, PSI, Inc., a financial 
services research firm in Tampa, Fla.). The Was/lington Post, 
relying on the same source, subsequently reported that, at the 
much higher $1 million of annual income level, 22 percent of 
the taxpayers were business owners and 22 percent were 
senior corporate executives. Farhi, "A Rise in the Rich Prompts 
a Debate, " The Washington Post A-I Col. 4, A-12 Col. 1 (Satur-
day, July 11, 1992) (source, PSI, Inc.; 1991 data). Most Sig-
nificantly, 36 percent were retired and the other category was 
only 3 percent, suggesting thai the "oth~r category," Fisher, 
supra, included retirees (although that article also states ~t ~he 
top I -percent level 15 percent are retired) . At the $1 mllhon 
level, medical profeSsionals accounte? for 9 percent ~nd at-
torneys for 8 percent . [d. And regardmg households ~n 1991 
with incomes over $75,000 or net worth over $300,000 mclud-
ing primary residence: 26 percent were corporate executives 
or managers; 16 percent were business owners; 9 percent were 
technical specialists; 4 percent were physicians; 3 percent were 
accountants; and 3 percent were attorneys. Cooper and Fried-
man, "The Rich in America," U.S . News & World Report 34,35 
(Nov. 18, 1991). A New York Times article reprinted in the 
Congressional Record during this debate stated that most ~f the 
top high-income taxpayers probably were small-bus~n~ss 
people and CEOs of large corporatio~s, bu~ half o~ theIr. 10-
come came from investment income Includmg capItal gams. 
Nasar, "Even Among the Well-Off, the Richest Get Richer," 
The New York Times, D-l, col. 2, at D-24, cols. 3-4 (Thursday 
March 5, 1992) (majority of top 20 percent probably own closely 
held businesses or manage Fortune 500 companies; wealthy 
get half of their income from investments which surged in the 
1980s; "The early 1990s have already clipped the wings of a 
lot of high-fliers as corporations have shed executives, law 
firms have down-sized, businesses have failed, and real estate 
values have collapsed."); reprinted in 138 Congo Rec. 53276, 
53918 (Senate March 11 and 19, 1992, respectively Daily Ed.). 
And I might add the LBO mania had abated . In . sh~rt, the 
speculative boom has collapsed. The average fa':IlIly mcome 
of the top 1 percent declined to roughly $350,000 In 1991 from 
$410,000 in 1989. Fisher, supra at 42-3. Indeed, the top 1 percent 
had peaked at average income of $617,000 earlier in 1988, 
Cooper and Friedman, supra at 34-5, before the leveraged 
buyout wave had ebbed. This post-boom trend at ~he . top 
income level probably bodes ill for the revenue projectIOns 
from the individual rate increases at the lOp. 
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C. Inside and Outside Disparities Before 
In the 1930s and again in the 1960s, populist mem-
bers of Congress criticized the lower inside subchapter 
C rates on smaller amounts of retained income in com-
parison to the higher individual rates applicable to 
partnership earnings. Both times, the answer from 
Treasury was the same: such small-business people 
should incorporate. And they did so under the 1954 
code, as the number of dose corporations grew from 
several hundred thousand to several million, almost 
half of which are S corporations under the 1986 code. 
D. The Mann-Hancock Proposal 
Mark Mann, a Chicago tax accountant representing 
closely held businesses, proposed at the March 31,1993 
House Ways and Means hearings that a "materia lly 
participating" entrepreneur's annual share of income 
retained by a passthrough entity (partnership or 5 cor-
poration), otherwise taxable at higher than the 31-per-
cent rate, be currently taxed instead of at the 
entrepreneur's level at the maximum corporate rate of 
34 percent (up to $10 million of income) with an addi-
tional (deferred) tax of 5.6. percent (39.6 percent - 34 
percent) triggered by distribution of this previously 
taxed but not distributed income. Obviously, having 
read Mann's hearing statement beforehand, Rep. Mel 
Hancock, R-Mo., who "happen[s] to have a subchapter 
5 corporation in the private world," questioned several 
witnesses at the March 21, 1993 House hearing as to 
the advisability of taxing an S corporation shareholder 
on his share of income left in the company "at the 
corporate rate until such time as he takes it out, maybe 
five years later. Then he would pay the higher in-
dividual tax rate. [in excess of the 34 percent already 
paid] ." Rep. Hancock explained that "the tax code 
should be an incentive for him to leave money in the 
company and expand his company." 
The Mann/Hancock proposal certainly would be an 
answer to the rhetoric that the proposed individual rate 
increases at the top would bear too heavily on small 
business. It also would clearly tax "capital" reinvested 
in the pass through entity lighter than labor (although 
at the $140,000 taxable family income level and certainly 
at the $250,000 level, that fact begins to lose its populist 
appeal). The Mann/Hancock proposal is, in my eyes, 
therefore, preferable only to (a) scrapping the in-
dividual rate increases at the top altogether, or (b) more 
likely winning over the conservative coalition (par-
ticularly on the Senate side) by coupling with the rate 
increases a substantial individual generic capital gains 
cut. It thus may be a "second best" solution. 
Serious consideration of this next logical step in 
schedular income76 would require addressing a num-
ber of issues. Would amounts taxed at 34 percent be 
subject to the higher tax at the shareholder/partner's 
death? If so, Congress might want to forgiv e the 
deferred tax if the family member inheriting the inter-
761 am not in principle opposed to schedular income; in 
theory, it should facilitate dividing and conquering special 
interest groups. 
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est continues in the business for a specified period of, 
say, five or eight years. And, by the way, what would 
the deferred tax be? The rate that would have applied 
in the year deferred? (With PEP and Pease?) Or simply 
the maximum rates at the time of distribution not-
withstanding bunching? I lean toward the latter, for 
ease of administration and as a little toll charge for the 
deferral. Also, it is likely that the deferred amounts 
won't be withdrawn but, rather, the business will be 
sold first. At least the deferred amounts should be 
"recaptured" at 39.6 percent, etc ., upon a sale. Indeed, 
arguably, none of the gain on the sale should be af-
forded generic capital gains treatment as a further toll 
charge for deferral. Should nonrecognition transfers of 
the stock or partnership interest as by gift or merger 
continue the deferral? I think not, since the aSSignment 
of income doctrine would be vitiated as to such trans-
fers. Congress chose, however, the opposite path in 
1962 in section 1250, despite Treasury's desire for gifts 
to trigger recapture. 
Even more difficult would be fashioning the rules 
for which subchapter 5 or partnership small businesses 
should qualify, and especially what the retained entity 
income must be invested in. The first cut as to qualify-
ing businesses would be to adopt the standards of ex-
cluded businesses and corporations under the 
proposed targeted small business capital gain. Similar-
ly, investments of retained passthrough entity income 
in stock or in real estate should be limited. But the more 
difficult areas would be avoiding the trouble spots of 
the current accumula ted earnings tax . For example, 
reserves for future expansion should not qualify. An 
alternative would be to allow the deferral in year one 
for amounts "held" in such a reserve, but reopen year 
one if expansion does note occur (or perhaps begin) 
within a specified period such as three years . Loans to 
the shareholder/partner or related parties should be 
treated as distributions. 
Mann asked in his hearing statement, but not in his 
actual testimony, for both the "corporate rate" on 
retained pass through earnings and targeted small busi-
ness capital gains for S corporations. This front end 
and back end preference is not justified . 
If Congress continues to provide graduated inside 
taxation of close C corporations, targeted capital gains 
might be defensible (although there is both a front and 
back end preference). But the ideal would be man-
datory passthrough of close C corporation income for 
taxation purposes coupled with a 34-percent rate on 
retained income reinvested in expansion with the 
deferred tax upon distribution/sale, etc. The billion or 
so dollar annual subsidy in the graduated close C cor-
poration rates would go a long way to paying for the 
lost/deferred revenues from using the 34-percent rate 
rather than the 36-percent/millionaire's surtax, PEP, 
and Pease as to qualified accumulations. This would 
favor the larger small-bus iness owner at the expense 
of the smaller owner, but there is no sound tax policy 
for the graduated inside close C corporation rate when 
the owners materially participate. See my testimony at 
the Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships 
Hearing before the House Ways and Means Subcom-
mittee on Select Revenue Measures, 100th Cong., 1st 
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Sess. 343-50 (1987). See also Lee, supra 8 Va. Tax Rev. 
57,88,94-5, 101, 107-09 (1988). 
IV. SMALL-BUSINESS CAPITAL GAINS CUT 
President Clinton campaigned on, among numerous 
other promises, a targeted small business tax cut.77 The 
proposed targeted small business capital gains cut of 
a 50-percent exclusion (maximum income tax rate of 
14 percent) of gain realized upon the sale or exchange 
of qualified small business stock held for five years or 
more constitutes a paradigm Clinton tax provision: (1) 
it is relatively inexpensive even assuming that it does 
attract outside capital so that it is a "leveraged" pro-
vision/8 (2) if it works, more jobs will be created since 
most new jobs currently are provided by small busi-
nesses;19 (3) favoring small businesses over big busi-
nesses is consistent with Clinton's populism; and (4) 
consistent with the president's pattern of promoting 
the ideas of others, the provision was originated by 
Senator Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., a long-time political 
ally of the president. 
A. 'Sunset' Provision 
Distributionally, the proposed targeted capital gains 
cut to a 14-percent maximum rate after a five-year 
holding period for sales of qualified small business 
17Bill Clinton, Putting People First 9 (1992) ("My plan 
would ... (h]elp small businesses and entrepreneurs by of-
fering a 50·percent tax exclusion to those who take risks by 
making long-term investments in new businesses."); "The 
1992 Campaign: Transcript of 3d TV Debate between Bush, 
Clinton and Perot," The New York Times A-20, col. 1 (Oct. 20, 
1992) ("We also provide . . . tax relief in terms of new incen-
tives for ... new small businesses .... "). 
78Remarks by President Clinton and his aides abound with 
references to leveraging government investments so as to 
attract larger private investments, as may be seen by search-
ing NEXIS with the terms "Clinton w/i 25 lever!." This is 
what President Clinton means by "public-private partner-
ships," also a searchable term. See generally Neikirk, "Clinton 
Preparing Government Overhaul," Chicago Triblme, C-6 (Sun-
day Nov. 22, 1992) ("With budgets tight, the federal role 
should be to use precious dollars as incentives and as 
leverage to accomplish its goals."). 
79President Clinton based his skewing of tax benefits to 
small business on the ground that the restructuring of big 
business resulted in a reduction in employment at that level 
every year in the 1980s, which until recently was more than 
offset by the creation of jobs in small business. Clinton's Feb. 
23, 1993 Remarks to the United States Chamber of Commerce 
and Feb. 17 State of the Union Address; accord Testimony of 
Secretary of the Treasury Bentsen at Feb. 24, 1993 Senate 
Finance Committee hearings ("small businesses are vital to 
our economy, since they are the major source now of new 
jobs."). The smaller firms with revenues of under $5 million 
constitute 90 percent of the firms and employ 40 percent of 
the work force. President Clinton's Feb. 17, 1993 State of the 
Union Address. But see March 25 Senate Finance Committee 
hearing testimony of Herbert Stein ("1 am not in favor of all 
of the preferences for small business that are in the 
president's plan. I think they reflect the kind of romantic 
notion about the exceptional contribution that small business 
makes to employment and innovation in this country. And I 
do not think that is justified."). 
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corporation stock would be the worst of any recent 
capital gains proposal, since the average income of 
small-business people is much higher than the average 
income of those realizing capital gains in generalso and 
virtually no low-income individuals own stock in small 
business corporations. But the proposal probably 
would have minimal effect on the effective rate at the 
top unless it succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of 
Senator Bumpers to attract outside capital. s1 If it did, 
the benefits probably would trickle down in the form 
of new jobs. So, like then-Senator, now Finance Com-
mittee Chairman, Moynihan in the 1978 debate over 
increasing the generic preference to open up capital for 
start-ups, I might be willing to try a targeted small 
business gain. But I suspect it would most likely turn 
out be a subsidys2 to people starting new mom and 
pops and high-techs (more machine tool companies 
than Silicon Valley start-ups) anyway, rather than an 
incentive that actually attracts outside capital (now any 
noncommercial financing is from the "entrepreneur," 
family, and friends). My guess is the primary effect of 
the small bus iness provision would be psychological 
- see how the administration likes small businesses 
- and in the real world, easing the credit crunch as 
the president is doing will have much more effect. 
Therefore, this time the experiment should have a sun-
set provision.s3 Only such a provision will answer 
Chairman Rostenkowski's fear (expressed in the con-
text of the investment tax credit) that Clinton's tax 
proposal will result in a subsidy after the need for a 
remedial incentive has passed and the plea of John 
White, Ph.D., testifying at the March 25, 1993 Senate 
SOJ'his is mostly intuitive, but in 1978 Treasury Secretary 
Michael Blumenthal said the former was the case. The 10:1 or 
$1 million cap would mitigate this, but the biggest factor 
would be the 50 percent of exclusion being subject to the AMT, 
resulting in a 21-percent rate for an individual at the proposed 
second 28-percent AMT rate. 
sll estimate that no more than 20 percent or so of high-in-
come individuals are small-business people. Furthermore, 
the preference would apply only to small-business stock is-
sued after 1992, which, in any event, would tend to be once 
in a lifetime sales (although frequently installment reported 
over five years or more). 
82By this, I mean it will reward people for doing what they 
would have done anyway. Surely, that is the case as to mom 
and pops, and I suspect as to most entrepreneurs in general. 
83lf neither outside capital comes in nor more ventures are 
formed during, say, a five-year window test period, then 
small businesses formed after the sunset (probably three 
years after the window is closed to give time to determine 
the effects), wou ld not qualify. Of course, small businesses 
formed from 1993 to the sunset would still get the preference 
when they are finally sold. Obviously too academic, but 
probably this would be the only way to repeal the small 
business preference if it is not increasing the formation or 
capitalization of such businesses. The increase in outside 
investors over the base would be easy to measure since now 
nonexistent. The increase in issuance of new small-business 
corporation stock would be very difficult to measure, since 
the base should take account of the effect of the economy, 
interest rates, and availability of credit in general on new 
formations. 
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hearings for a mid-course review of the stimulus pack-
age in 1997. 
B. How Big Is Small? 
As far as size goes, the real dividing line between 
large and small corporations is probably $100 million 
adjus~ed basis in assets (at least when the economy is 
boommg). In 1988, the 5,000 corporations with assets 
of $250 million or more held 80 percent of corporate 
assets and earned 74 percent of corporate income after 
~OL deductions. Adding the next set of 5,000 corpora-
tions (assets from $100 million to $250 million) raised 
the asset totals only to 84 percent and income to 79 
percent after NOLs. The numbers for 1989 are similar. 
Already, the administration has raised the threshold 
from $25 to $50 million in assets. 
C. Coverage of S Corporations 
The more important issue is whether to cover S cor-
porations. Currently, they constitute almost half of all 
small or close corporations and earn probably half of 
the income at this level.84 Not covering them would 
make the choice of tax entity for new ventures very 
complex. Reversal of the trend to passthrough entities 
for small business would be unfortunate, since on a 
policy basis, material participants should be taxed 
directly on the earnings of the entity they control. If 
the code were rigorously enforced and small busi-
nesses. conducted as C corporations closely audited, 
compliance costs would increase substantially since 
most of the corporate tax problems in operation arise 
from small businesses carried on as C corporations: 
construc~ive dividends, unreasonable compensation, 
r~demptIOns, accumulated earnings, etc. See my tes-
timony at the Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partner-
ships Hearings before the House Ways and Means Sub-
committee on Select Revenue Measures, 100th Cong., 
1st Sess. 343-50 (1987). See also 8 Va . Tax Rev. 57, 107-08 
(1988). 
On the other hand, due to the p reclusion of partner-
ships owning S corporation stock as well as the ceiling 
on number of owners, it is unlikely that outside high-
income individuals will invest heavily in S corpora-
tions (particularly when its income will be taxed at as 
high as the low 405 to them). Thus, extension of a 
capital gains preference to S corporations would be 
even more of a subsidy to entrepreneurs who likely 
would have gone into business for themselves anyway 
and are unlikely to turn that decision on the potential 
of a pot of gold capital gains reward 10 to 20 years 
down the road. Cutting against this assumption are the 
comments by members of Congress across the 1970s 
through the early 19905 that most of their small busi-
ness constituents are most interested in a capital gains 
84My estimate is based on the 1988 Corporate Statistics of 
Income data showing that S corporations earned almost 10 
percent of corporate income and the big 10,000 corporations 
earned ~lmost 80 percent, adjusted upward for the continued 
growth m the number of S corporations. 
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preference for their closely held stock.8s If the in-
dividual shareholder's share of S corporation income 
is subjected to the highest individual rates, allowing a 
back end small business capital gain politically 
strengthens the rate increase. 
D. Thwarting the Conservative Coalition 
Former Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mor-
timer Caplin and the former Assistant Treasury 
Secretary for Tax Policy, Roger Mentz, observed at the 
November 1992 Virginia Tax Study Group meeting at 
the University of Virginia School of Law that President 
Clinton might propose a targeted small business capi-
tal preference (as he has), but Congress would likely 
pass a generic preference. This conventional wisdom 
roughly reflects the experience in the House of Presi-
~ents Kennedy and Carter in 1963 and 1978, respec-
tIvely, and Chairman Rostenkowski in 1989. Once a 
limited capital proposal was on the table, conservative 
(primarily Southern) Democrats joined with 
Republicans to vote for a generic preference. Until the 
filibuster by Senate Republicans against President 
Clinton's economic plan, I predicted that the conserva-
tive coalition on capital gains would not arise this time, 
pri~arily .due to high lost revenue cost of a generic 
caP.Ital gams pref~rence over a five-year budget period, 
whIch must be paId for under the OBRA 1990 operating 
rules. In the 1989/1992 debate, the projected revenue 
loss of the various generic cuts proposed by the Bush 
administration ranged over five yea rs from about $12 
billion to $24 billion using JCT figures. The proposed 
small business capital gains cut would cost only $700 
million and change over the five-year window. Secondly, 
Pre~ident .Clinton campaigned hard against a generiC 
capItal gaInS cut and there a lready has been growing 
party sol idarity on capital gains and rate increases 
fr~m .1990 on, particularly in the House. This partisan-
shIp IS reflected 10 the recent administration victory in 
the House on the budget resolution. For comparable 
party solidarity in tax matters, you have to go back to 
the first part of the Roosevelt Era, when FDR could 
more or less obtain party solidari ty until 1937, but 
wasn't really serio us about federal income taxation 
until this power had begun to fray. Pres ident Clinton 
clearly does not have the same majority in the Senate 
8SSee Hearings on the President's 1978 Tax Reduction and 
Reform Proposals Before the HOl/ se Ways and Means Committ ee 
(Part 5), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2803 (1978) (Statement of Rep. 
Ed Jenk~ns, D-Ga.); 135 Congo Rec. at H6295 (House Sept. 28. 
1989 Dally Ed.) (Remarks of Rep. Dreir. R-Cal.) (semble). This 
anecdotal evidence is somewhat confirmed by a recent survey. 
"Family Business Prefer Lower Capital Gains Rate Over 
Lower Estate and Gift Taxes, Says Coopers & Lybrand." 93 
Tax Notes Today 82-87 (April 7, 1993); "Senior Execs Give 
Priority to Deficit Reduction and Tax Incentives, " 93 Tax Not es 
Today 49-59 (February 23. 1993) (in a February Ernst & Young 
survey, smaller companies' executives ranked a capital gains 
tax cut as "very important"); "Small-Business Owners Want 
Capital Gains Cut, Arthur Andersen Survey Says," 92 Tax 
Notes Today 239-60 (November 11, 1992). 
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as in the House, but almost the same party solidarity. 
This party solidarity more recently has more than 
frayed at the edges. 
Notwithstanding President Clinton1s 
probable ability to obtain enactment of 
a freestanding small-business capital 
gains cut, I recommend steps to 
thwart a future expansion to a 
generic capital gains cut. 
Notwithstanding President Clinton's probable 
ability to obtain enactment of a freestanding small-
business capital gains cut, I recommend steps to thwart 
a future expansion of this provision into a generic capi-
tal gains cut. In 1992, some Republicans talked of com-
ing back another day to fashion a generic cut if a tar-
geted small-business cut were enacted. Coupling with 
a targeted small-business provision a progressive 
generic cut, as the Senate and the Conference Commit-
tee did in 1992,86 just might attract enough Southern 
Democrats, due to the benefits under a progressive rate 
for recurring livestock sales by farmers as well as some 
of the timber royalty taxpayers with low cash income,B7 
if such benefits were so explained to the Southern 
Democrats (and if the interests they champion are truly 
the only ones they really want to champion). I would 
advocate a progressive capital gains rate structure for 
the reasons stated at I. B.4 . above. Indeed, it and the 
annual $3,500 exclusion are the only capital gains 
provisions I personally would support in the abstract 
and, of course, in the alternative. To really split the 
current conservative coalition and keep it split, couple 
those measures wi th a small-business provision and a 
capital gains preference for timber and livestock only. 
861 don't regard the 1992 vote as a true "footnote" as Chair-
man Moynihan described it in Clymer, "Senate Tax Bill Wraps 
Up a Bouquet of Tria l Balloons," New York Times, A-30, col. 1, 
at col. 2 (March 15, 1992). Wasn't it much more of a campaign 
statement for both parties, as Senators Packwood and Rud-
man then said? See 138 Congo Rec. S3264 (Senate March 11, 1992 
Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Senator Packwood, Senate Finance 
Committee member); accord. 138 Congo Rec. S3181 (Senate 
March 11,1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Senator Packwood); cf. 
id. at S3099 (Senate March 10, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of 
Senator Ernest Hollings, D-S.C.); 138 Congo Rec. 53363-64 
(Senate March 12, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Senator Warren 
Rudman, R-N.H.). 
871n the late 19505, only livestock and, to a lesser degree, 
timber were heavily realized by then-middle-income 
families. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1963 Before the Senate 
Finance Committee (Part 1), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1963). 
And such types of capital gains made up less than 9 percent 
of all capital gains - mostly livestock rather than royalties. 
In 1973 and 1977, timber gains amounted to .6 percent and 
1.2 percent, and livestock amounted to .4 percent and .5 per-
cent of all capital gains realizations, respectively (but no 
distributional effects were provided). Treasury, Report to Con-
gress on the Capital Gains Tax Reductions of 1978 (Sept. 1985). 
Obviously, we need more recent data on this and many other 
factual statements or assumptions in text and footnotes. 
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E. Section 1244 Deductions 
Some of the small business corporations invested in 
by a pooled fund for high-income individuals might 
qualify under section 1244 so that $100,000 in losses 
will be ordinary. Since the cap on "smallness" here is 
$1 million, section 1244(c)(3)(A), the overlap may not 
be substantial. Nevertheless, the question arises as to 
whether such a pooled fund partnership should be able 
to pass through its section 1244 ordinary losses . 
F. Sale of Mom-and-Pop Businesses 
I understand from repeated conversations with Vir-
ginia tax practitioners at local tax conferences over the 
past five years or so that the almost universal pattern 
of sales of closely held corporate businesses is an asset 
sale by the target corporation (often on the installment 
basis) followed by a liquidation of the target . While the 
Bumpers bill spoke of a sale or exchange and a section 
331 liquidation is treated as a sale at the shareholder 
level, the legislative history should provide that the 
active business test is applied immediately prior to the 
sale where the liquidation timely occurs thereafter. 
Congress might use the 1954 code section 337 12-month 
test. 
G. Passive and Tainted Business Exceptions 
The legislative history should spell out the ration-
ales for the exclusion of service, financial, real estate, 
farming, mineral extraction, and hospitality businesses 
from the proposed targeted capital gains. At first blush, 
the approach seems by-and-Iarge a ra tionalization or 
perhaps mechanization of the old passive income tests 
for personal holding companies. More likely, the com-
mon element is upfront preferences, primarily in the 
form of accelera ted depreciation / amortization (rea I 
estate, mineral extraction, hospitality and, perhaps, 
farming), simplified accoun ting rules (small farms and 
service businesses), or low effective rates in general 
due to various preferences (financial institutions, par-
ticularly banks and insurance companies). Under the 
la tter ra tiona Ie, a targeted capital gains preference 
upon disposition plus up-front preferences would con-
stitute a "double hit" in the words of then-Senate 
Finance Committee Chairman Bentsen (commenting 
on the exclusion of depreciable assets from the Bush 
administration's 1989 proposed capital gains 
preference) . 
H. Size of Preference Limitations 
The 10:1 and $1 million gain restrictions, together 
with the inclusion of half the small business preference 
in the AMT base (for a 21-percent maximum gain), are 
a ll necessary to prevent horizontal disparity from aris-
ing should pooled fund investments in small business 
flourish. In other words, without these limitations, a 
substantial number of high-income individuals might 
be able to achieve effective rates in the high teens, far 
below the proposed 28-percent AMT rate . This would 
bring back part of the horizontal and vertica l inequities 
of the 1954 code. These limitations should be sticking 
points for the administration. AMT is particularly vul-
nerable to a small-business carve-out, as demonstrated 
by the House conservative coalition in 1978 and House 
Republicans in 1992. But if the preference is not subject 
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to the AMT, old vertical and horizontal disparities 
would reappear if the pooled funds/outside capital 
approach is successful. 
v. DEATHTIME TAXATION OF APPRECIATION 
I believe (and judging from the literature, it is 
probably the majority academic view) that ideal tax 
rules would provide for annual accrual of public stock 
gain and loss, preferably coupled with some sort of 
passthrough integration of corporate and shareholder 
taxes, ~n~ taxation at death of other unrealized capital 
appreciation and perhaps carryover basis for closely 
held businesses and farms with a step up if the 
enteTJ~rise is continued by the family for five years. 
IndexIng of the basis of capital and depreciable assets 
and of debt completes the ideal package. History sug-
gests, however, that enactment of these rules is not 
politically feasible. Moreover, I fear that a serious 
attempt to institute taxation at death of unrealized 
capital appreciation would result at least in the conser-
vative coalition broadening the capital gains 
preference to a generic one. It appears that half of the 
appreciation in public stock obtains a stepped up basis 
at death . A taxation at death rule would probably raise 
1418 
revenue more by unblocking those sales by older ta x-
payers than by deemed sales at death. My further guess 
IS that the conservative coalition could block a com-
bination of both the proposed rate increases and taxa-
tion of capital gains at death . The likely result would 
be generic capital gains linked with one or the other. 
~h~ net result would probably be the same progres-
slvlty as at present, say 28 percent at the top. The 
proposed rate increase with only a targeted capital gain 
preference and a largely intact PAL should raise the 
effective rate two or three points. Therefore, I would 
not open that Pandora's box . But if I did , I would adapt 
Senator Kennedy'S 1976 and 1981 proposa ls to carve 
out small businesses and farms (with a $1 million or 
so cap) to deflect the inevitable arguments that taxation 
of unrealized capital appreciation at death would fall 
heaviest on holders of public s tock . The best approach 
here, and which I would favor beyond tongue-in-
cheek, would be carryover basis for family owned 
enterprises with step up to date of death value if a 
member of the family materially participates in the 
enterprise for a specified period after the decedent' s 
death, much like the special farm use valuation 
provisions of section 2032A. 
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